A scenario-based role-playing experiment is well suited for research seeking to understand how and why operations and supply chain managers, when dealing with complex issues, form their judgments and preferences or make the decisions that they do. As a method for data collection, a scenario-based role-playing experiment deploys varying versions of a descriptive vignette to convey scripted information about specific levels of factors of interest that are hypothesized, upfront, to influence judgments, preferences or decisions. Human subjects are recruited to assume an a priori defined role and, in this role, to then form their judgments and preferences or make their decisions in response to the scripted information conveyed in at least one version of the vignette. For these judgments, preferences or decisions to be useful for subsequent statistical analyses, the vignette and its varying versions to be deployed in a scenario-based role-playing experiment must be appropriately designed (i.e., written and presented) and validated. This commentary speaks to this ''vignette design and validation'' issue and prescribes a three-stage process to create a vignette with its derivative versions that is clear, realistic, complete (in that it contains all information necessary for human subjects to assume their role and to consequently provide their reactions and responses), and is effective (in that it cues human subjects to perceive the desired levels of the factors of interest).

Research on trust in buyer–supplier relationships has tended to focus on the performance outcomes of a trusting relationship, as well as the processes that serve to build trust. Largely absent from the buyer–supplier literature is an in‐depth examination of activities that break down trust, and the resulting effect on supplier trust in the buyer. The authors propose and test a model that evaluates psychological contract violations between a buyer and a supplier as a mediating variable of the effect of unethical activities on trust within a partnership. Survey data was collected from 110 tier one suppliers of major corporations in the state of Ohio. Our results show how a supplier's perception of a violation of the psychological contract either partially mediates or fully mediates the relationship between the buyers unethical activity and the suppliers trust in that buyer. We discuss how suppliers may demonstrate bounded ethicality when they overlook perceived unethical behaviors by the buyer.

A psychological contract defines the perceived reciprocal obligations that characterize a relationship between an individual and organizational entity. Breach of a psychological contract can negatively affect work behaviors and attitudinal perceptions, and may also elicit an emotional response (violation) which can help to explain these negative consequences. This research focuses on the role of psychological contracts in a supply chain setting. We explore when and how three conditions of psychological contract breach – attribute, severity, and timing – negatively impact outcomes, and assess the mediating role of psychological contract violation in this relationship. To evaluate our hypotheses, we employ a laboratory experiment in which participants assume the role of a purchasing manager. We impose various breach factors and observe their relative impact on the decision‐making behavior and fairness perceptions of the participant. We show that while the breach factors significantly impact task behavior, these relationships are not explained by psychological contract violation. However, violation is useful in explaining, in part, the results pertaining to fairness perceptions.

In late 2018, the Journal of Operations Management published an invited methods article by Lonati et al. (2018) to provide guidance to authors on how to design behavioral experiments to achieve the rigor required for consideration in the journal. That article was written as a response to a number of behavioral research submissions to JOM, each dealing with interesting topics but viewed by the editors to possess poor design choices at inception. While the Lonati et al. (2018) piece provides experimental guidance fitting to certain research agendas, questions have arisen concerning whether and how exactly to implement some of the points that it makes, and how to best address trade‐offs in the design of behavioral experiments. Questions have also arisen concerning how to apply these concepts in operations management research. This technical note seeks to address these questions, by diving into the details of research risks and trade‐offs regarding demand effects, incentives, deception, sample selection, and context‐rich vignettes. The authors would like to recognize the input of a large number of senior scholars in the JOM community who have provided support and feedback as we have sought to help authors tease out what can reasonably be done in designing strong behavioral experiments that fit various research agendas.

Today's globally competitive environment presents ample opportunity for buyers to dissolve relationships by switching suppliers. While previous studies have described supplier switching behavior based on supplier attributes and switching costs, our study leverages attribution theory to evaluate the impact of psychological contracts on supplier switching behavior. We report the results of a controlled experiment involving 265 subjects in which we manipulate three characteristics of a psychological contract breach: attribution (whether the breach was due to reneging by the supplier or a disruption), severity (whether the breach was major or minor), and timing (whether the breach was early or late in the life cycle of the exchange history). Our analysis indicates that in the context of supplier switching, buyers are affected by the attribution and severity of a breach but not by the timing. In contrast to previous experimental research in noncompetitive settings, we find that psychological contract violation mediates the relationship between breach and behavior. We further complement our primary findings with a vignette-based experiment and interview data collected from experienced managers. Our research makes an important contribution to the relationship dissolution and industrial buyer behavior literatures by providing a behavioral explanation for supplier switching and reveals the complex role of psychological contracts in supply chain exchanges.

Information leakages—the unauthorized sharing of an organization's information with another organization—are a growing concern in today's supply chains, but remain relatively underexplored. Drawing on attribution theory and observational learning, our research investigates inter‐organizational information leakages from a network perspective. We assess the spillover effects of opportunistic and inadvertent information leakages between an OFFENDER organization and a VICTIM organization on the relationship between the OFFENDER and a nonpartisan OBSERVER. We consider the roles of integrity‐ and ability‐based trust, as well as operational similarity between the organizations. We conducted scenario‐based experiments with 181 sales practitioners recruited via MTurk and supplemented those results with post hoc interviews. Our results show clear spillover effects: The OBSERVER's willingness to share information with the OFFENDER decreases significantly after any type of information leakage between the OFFENDER and the VICTIM, but more so for opportunistic leakages. Integrity‐based trust mediates the relationship between intentionality and information sharing willingness. We also find indications of an unexpected collateral damage effect in that to some extent, both trust dimensions decrease in both forms of information leakage. Further, for opportunistic information leakages, the OBSERVER's willingness to share information with the OFFENDER decreases more when OBSERVER and VICTIM are operationally similar.

Supply disruptions are commonplace in today's global supply chain environment. The sheer magnitude of daily transactions makes it inevitable that there will be disruptions, further exacerbated by differences in cultural norms and attitudes that add a layer of complexity to managerial response. In this research, we examine the impact of national culture on individuals' responses to supply disruptions due to psychological contract breach. Using data from controlled experiments conducted with 158 subjects in China and 125 subjects in the U.S., we evaluate changes in decision-making behaviors and assessments of attitudinal outcomes regarding trust and repurchase intentions. Our results show post-breach behavioral differences based on national culture, but find that these differences are short-term in nature. Additionally, cultural differences show up in both of the attitudinal outcomes assessed in this research. Following a psychological contract breach, individuals from the U.S. express less trust in their supply chain partner and less willingness to work with that partner again in the future as compared to individuals from China. Our research suggests that managers and scholars interested in the cultural influences on the response to supply disruption will benefit from further research and understanding focusing on the intersection of psychological contract breach and cultural distance.

Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to focus on the role of information sharing as a deterrent to unethical behavior in a buyer-supplier relationship. The authors investigate the broader supplier network, examining information sharing as it occurs through both the buyer-supplier structure as well as supplier-supplier structures. The authors propose that buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier information sharing serve to reduce perceived buying firm unethical behavior while at the same time fostering increased commitment and satisfaction in long-term buyer-supplier relationships. Design/methodology/approach -The relational model presented is grounded in the theory of social contract. The authors' hypotheses are tested using structural equation modeling with survey data collected from supplier firms from a wide range of industries and that have been involved long-term (minimum of five years) in the provision of goods and/or services with their buying firm. Findings -The authors demonstrate that perceived buying firm unethical behavior goes beyond the nature of the dyadic buyer-supplier relationship; the supplier's entire structure of contacts facilitates the flow of information regarding a buying firm. Originality/value -This research contributes to the operations and supply chain management literatures by adopting a more comprehensive view of the networks involved in relationship management efforts than what has typically been evaluated in these literatures.