Categories and Appreciation – A Reply to Sackris

Skilleås, Ole Martin; Burnham, Douglas

doi:10.1007/s10790-014-9441-1

Cited by 3 publications

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“…In the field of aesthetics, we find a similarly broad acceptance of this form of argument, namely, that there is something called “proper” or “correct” aesthetic appreciation of an object, which is usually grounded in a further belief that this appreciation of the object must be based in the right kind of reasons. Contemporary philosophers who have voiced support for some basic version of this idea include Kendall Walton (1970), Allen Carlson (1981), Douglas Burnham and Ole Skilleås (2012, 2014), Matthew Kieran (2010, 2011), Aaron Meskin et al (2013), Stephen Davies (2006), Roger Scruton (2009), Barry C. Smith (2007), and Cain Todd (2011), to name a few.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Perniciousness of Higher-Order Evidence on Aesthetic Appreciation

Sackris

Larsen

2023

Dialogue

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We demonstrate that many philosophers accept the following claim: When an aesthetic object is apprehended correctly, taking pleasure in said object is a reliable sign that the object is aesthetically successful. We undermine this position by showing that what grounds our pleasurable experience is opaque: In many cases, the experienced pleasure is attributable to factors that have little to do with the aesthetic object. The evidence appealed to is a form of Higher-Order Evidence (HOE) and we consider attempts to overcome said evidence. We argue they are unsuccessful. We conclude by considering what this means for our practice of making aesthetic judgements.

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