What Jancis Robinson Didn’t Know May Have Helped Her

The Perniciousness of Higher-Order Evidence on Aesthetic Appreciation

“…Bach (2013) makes this same distinction between taking pleasure in a work and taking pleasure in knowing about a work, as doesSackris (2018).The Perniciousness of Higher-Order Evidence on Aesthetic Appreciation…”

“…Bach (2013) makes this same distinction between taking pleasure in a work and taking pleasure in knowing about a work, as does Sackris (2018).…”

“…Furthermore, if we cannot be sure what is grounding our aesthetic appreciation, then, by extension, we cannot be sure that we have attended to the aesthetic object/event in the "correct" way, or what even his survey of theories of aesthetic value, he comes to the conclusion that, historically, philosophers have almost uniformly identified aesthetic value with pleasure; Prinz (2011) identifies aesthetic experience with a kind of pleasurable awe; Larsen and Sackris (2020) identify positive aesthetic experience with positively valanced emotions (although no particular emotion); for Gorodeisky and Marcus (2018) to judge something aesthetically good is to judge it worthy of being liked. See also Kieran (2010Kieran ( , 2011; Nanay (2017); Sackris (2018). Modern interpreters seem to take Hume to have advocated a position on which the ideal critic gets more pleasure out their appreciative experience than the ordinary judge.…”

“…However, many theorists have posited that aesthetic appreciation has something to do with pleasure: We can interpret Kant as taking pleasure to be a constituent element of aesthetic judgement (Budd, 1999; Zangwill, 2021); Davies holds that the distinctive function of art is to “provide an aesthetically (or artistically) pleasurable experience when contemplated for its own sake” (Davies, 2006, p. 228) Walton (1970) seems to endorse such a view when he explicitly argues that we should aim to appreciate a work in the category that allows it to come off best; although Lopes (2018) gives an account of aesthetic appreciation that does not depend on pleasure, in his survey of theories of aesthetic value, he comes to the conclusion that, historically, philosophers have almost uniformly identified aesthetic value with pleasure; Prinz (2011) identifies aesthetic experience with a kind of pleasurable awe; Larsen and Sackris (2020) identify positive aesthetic experience with positively valanced emotions (although no particular emotion); for Gorodeisky and Marcus (2018) to judge something aesthetically good is to judge it worthy of being liked. See also Kieran (2010, 2011); Nanay (2017); Sackris (2018). Modern interpreters seem to take Hume to have advocated a position on which the ideal critic gets more pleasure out their appreciative experience than the ordinary judge.…”

“… 4 See, for example, Brochet (2001); Cutting (2003); Malfeito-Ferreira (2021); Salganik et al (2006); Salganik and Watts (2009); Wansink et al (2007). For discussion of this evidence as it relates to philosophical aesthetics, see Kieran (2010, 2011); Meskin et al (2018); Sackris (2018, 2020). …”