Catch share programs in developing countries: A survey of the literature

Jardine, Sunny L.; Sanchirico, James N.

doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2012.03.010

Cited by 35 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 45 publications

(94 reference statements)

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“…Hence, we can discuss input regulations based on the primal formulation of the problem, and, due to the relationship between the primal formulation and the dual formulation of the problem, the basic results in this paper generalize to the case of input regulations. This is particularly relevant for fisheries management in developing countries, which commonly rely on input regulations as the main management instrument, although individual quotas are gaining ground also in developing world fisheries (Jardine and Sanchirico, 2012).…”

Section: The Model and The Basic Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Corporate-Crime Perspective on Fisheries: Liability Rules and Non-Compliance

Jensen

2015

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:The existing fisheries economics literature analyzes compliance problems by treating the fishing firm as one cohesive unit, but in many cases, violations are committed by agents acting on behalf of a firm. To account for this, we analyze the principal-agent relationship within the fishing firm. In the case where the firm directly benefits from illegal fishing, the firm must induce its crew to violate regulations through the incentive scheme. Within this framework, we analyze how the allocation of liability between fishing firms and crew affects quota violations and the ability to design a socially efficient fisheries policy. We show that without wage frictions, it does not matter whom is held liable. However, under the commonly used share systems of remuneration, crew liability generally yields a more efficient outcome than firm liability. Furthermore, asset restrictions may affect the outcome under various liability rules. JEL code: Q2

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Section: The Model and The Basic Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Corporate-Crime Perspective on Fisheries: Liability Rules and Non-Compliance

Jensen

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…Recently, Jardine and Sanchirico (2012) investigated the implementation of catch share programs in developing countries and the correlation with a number of dimensions, namely, governance, resource value, type of catch share, and species characteristics. The authors found interesting results because countries which have catch shares showed higher governance rankings, stronger economies, highvalue fishing industries, and fewer people employed in fisheries.…”

Section: Are Itqs the Best Tool To Solve The Problems Of Modern Fishementioning

confidence: 99%

Credible Enforcement Policies Under Illegal Fishing: Does Individual Transferable Quotas Induce to Reduce the Gap Between Approved and Proposed Allowable Catches?

Rocha

Villasante

González³

2013

AMBIO

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In general, approved Total Allowable Catches (TACs) are higher than proposed TACs by the scientific assessment and reported landings approved are higher than approved TAC. We build a simple enforcement agency's behavior model that generates-as a rational behaviorthose two facts. The model has two ingredients. First, there exists illegal fishing generated by an imperfect enforcement technology; second, the enforcement agency cannot commit on announced penalties. We show that lack of commitment increases the potential benefits for national enforcement agency of deviating from proposal (scientific optimal) quotas. Although the enforcement agency wants to announce a low quota target to induce a low level of illegal harvest, it will find optimal to revise the quota announced in order to reduce penalties and improve fishermen welfare. Therefore, agencies find it optimal to approve higher quotas than that proposed by the scientific advice. Our main result is to show that when full compliance is not possible, and national agencies cannot commit, the introduction of Individual Transferable Quotas increases the potential benefits for agencies of deviating from the optimal proposed TAC by the scientific advised.

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“…Most of these performance assessments have been done on developed world fisheries (Jardine and Sanchirico 2012), which is a reflection of where most of the early adopters of rights-based systems are found (e.g., Iceland, New Zealand, Canada), and the locations where the data are rich enough to measure impacts (see, e.g., Grafton, Squires et al 2000, Shotton 2001, Newell, Sanchirico and Kerr (2005, Newell, Papps and Sanchirico (2007), Chu (2009), andMRAG (2009)). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluation of the Chilean Jack Mackerel ITQ System

Kroetz¹,

Sanchirico²,

Peña-Torres³

et al. 2016

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work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license. Tables Table 1: Timeline The debate in commercial fishery management has evolved from whether well-defined rights are necessary for sustainability to measuring the impacts of different rights-based system designs. Most assessments are on developed world fisheries. Using a unique collection of datasets, we develop counterfactuals to evaluate the impacts of the Chilean Jack Mackerel catch share program. We investigate vessel and trip characteristics, as well as trip costs and revenues, before and after the implementation of the program. We find an increase in higher value products and associated revenue, as well as consolidation of catch on larger vessels, vessels taking longer trips, and catching more per trip. Overall, we estimate that the program led to a measureable increase in fishing profits, mainly due to movement toward higher value products. A back-of-the-envelope calculation results in an implied annual quota rental rate on the order of ~15-19% of ex-vessel prices. JEL Codes. Q22

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Catch share programs in developing countries: A survey of the literature

Cited by 35 publications

References 45 publications

A Corporate-Crime Perspective on Fisheries: Liability Rules and Non-Compliance

A Corporate-Crime Perspective on Fisheries: Liability Rules and Non-Compliance

Credible Enforcement Policies Under Illegal Fishing: Does Individual Transferable Quotas Induce to Reduce the Gap Between Approved and Proposed Allowable Catches?

Evaluation of the Chilean Jack Mackerel ITQ System

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