Caste and Punishment: The Legacy of Caste Culture in Norm Enforcement

Hoff, Karla; Kshetramade, Mayuresh; Fehr, Ernst

doi:10.1037/e596212012-001

Cited by 14 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…As Fehr and Hoff (2011) noted, such views become obsolete with the growing literature showing that preferences can be endogenous and can be shaped by societal and cultural influence (Bowles, 1998;Henrich, 2000;Stern, Dethier, & Rogers, 2005;Eugster, Lalive, Steinhauer, & Zweimüller, 2011;Hoff, Kshetramade, & Fehr, 2011).…”

Section: Relationship Between Culture and Time Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Time Preferences Differ: Evidence from 45 Countries

2010

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We present results from the first large-scale international survey on time preference, conducted in 53 countries. All countries exhibit hyperbolic discounting patterns, i.e., the immediate future is discounted more than far future. We also observe higher heterogeneity for shorter time horizons, consistent with the pattern reviewed by Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002). Cultural factors as captured by the Hofstede cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1991) contribute significantly to the variation of time discounting, even after controlling for economic factors, such as GDP, inflation rate and growth rate. In particular, higher levels of Uncertainty Avoidance are associated with stronger hyperbolic discounting, whereas higher degrees of Individualism and Long Term Orientation predict stronger tendency to wait for larger payoffs. We also find the waiting tendency is correlated with innovation, environmental protection, crediting rating, and body mass index at country level after controlling for county wealth. These results help us to enhance the understanding of differences across financial markets and economic behavior worldwide.

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Section: Relationship Between Culture and Time Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Time Preferences Differ: Evidence from 45 Countries

2010

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“…However, in every society there exist various social groups who might also show a large variation in cooperative behaviour (e.g. Ockenfels & Weimann 1999;Fehr et al 2002a;Bellemare & Kröger 2007;Hong & Bohnet 2007;Hoff et al 2009;Kocher et al 2009;Gächter & Herrmann in press;Henrich et al in press). It is an important task for future research to understand this sort of variation relative to the sources of variation we have identified in this paper.…”

Section: Summary and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Culture and cooperation

Gächter

Herrmann

Thöni

2010

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

249

172

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Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper, we provide an answer by analysing the data of Herrmann et al. (2008a), who studied cooperation and punishment in 16 subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (2000)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and grouplevel differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities.

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“…A variant consists of supposing a preference for reciprocity: individuals are altruistic with others who display cooperative behavior, but may sanction those who do not respect cooperative norms (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;Fehr and 7 Gaetcher, 2000; Gintis et al, 2005;Hoff et al, 2011). In all these setting, individuals are assumed to have other-regarding preferences, and not just self-regarding preferences, which allow cooperation to emerge in groups of anonymous and with substantial size (see Bowles and Gintis for a synthesis, 2007) On the assumption that there do exist psychological costs from non cooperation, we can modify the payoffs of the trust game described above by adding a cost from non cooperation.…”

Section: Cooperation and Other-regarding Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust, Growth, and Well-Being: New Evidence and Policy Implications

Algan

Cahuc

2014

Handbook of Economic Growth

253

179

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. This survey reviews the recent research on trust, institutions and growth. It discusses the various measures of trust and documents the substantial heterogeneity of trust across space and time. The conceptual mechanisms and the methods employed to identify the causal impact of trust on economic performance are reviewed. We document the mechanisms of interactions between trust and economic development in the realms of finance, innovation, the organization of firms, the labor market and the product market. The last part reviews recent progress to identify how institutions and policies can affect trust and well-being. JEL Classification:O11, O43, Z13

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Caste and Punishment: The Legacy of Caste Culture in Norm Enforcement

Cited by 14 publications

References 14 publications

How Time Preferences Differ: Evidence from 45 Countries

How Time Preferences Differ: Evidence from 45 Countries

Culture and cooperation

Trust, Growth, and Well-Being: New Evidence and Policy Implications

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