Care and affective relations: Social justice and sociology

Abstract

This article examines the ways in which the care-indifferent and gendered character of much political egalitarian theory has contributed to a disregard for the care-relational dimensions of social injustice within the social sciences. It demonstrates how the lack of in-depth engagement with affective relations of love, care and solidarity has contributed to an underestimation of their pivotal role in generating injustices in the production of people in their humanity. While humans are political, economic and cultural beings, they are also what Tronto has termed homines curans. Yet, care, in its multiple manifestations, is treated as a kind of ‘cultural residual’, an area of human life that the dominant culture neglects, represses and cannot even recognize for its political salience. If sociology takes the issue of relational justice as seriously as it takes issues of redistribution, recognition and political representation, this would provide an intellectual avenue for advancing scholarship that recognizes that much of life is lived, and injustices are generated, outside the market, formal politics and public culture. A new sociology of affective care relations could enhance a normatively-led sociology of inequality, that is distinguishable from, but intersecting with, a sociology of inequality based on class (redistribution), status (recognition) and power (representation). It would also help change public discourse about politics by making affective in/justices visible intellectually and politically, and in so doing, identifying ways in which they could be a site of resistance to capitalist values and processes.

Enacting efficient care within a context of rationalisation

“…As Tronto (2018) notes, ‘care is not only work or labour; it is also a disposition and an attitude taken that requires one to focus on the needs of the cared-for object or person or group’ (p. 22). Thus, in contrast to other systems of social relations, care relations operate under an ethic of other-centredness – being centred on the development and well-being of another (Lynch et al, 2021). One main argument underpinning this branch of scholarship is that care cannot be completely marketised and commodified or withdrawn (Lynch et al, 2021; Williams, 2018).…”

“…Thus, in contrast to other systems of social relations, care relations operate under an ethic of other-centredness – being centred on the development and well-being of another (Lynch et al, 2021). One main argument underpinning this branch of scholarship is that care cannot be completely marketised and commodified or withdrawn (Lynch et al, 2021; Williams, 2018). However, due to the distinct ethically informed character of care relations, care is especially vulnerable to exploitation and social injustice.…”

“…Scholars have raised concern over heightened rationalisation (Brown & Korczynski, 2017) and the social misrecognition and devaluation of care work (Budig et al, 2019; Elstad & Vabø, 2021). While feminist scholars have documented the vulnerability and interdependency in care practices, recent contributions have argued that the importance of care in creating social injustice in contemporary societies is underestimated in mainstream sociology (Lynch et al, 2021). Taking a care-ethical approach, these scholars argue that care relations are different from other systems of social relations, because they operate under an ethic of other-centeredness (Lynch et al, 2021; Williams, 2018).…”

“…While feminist scholars have documented the vulnerability and interdependency in care practices, recent contributions have argued that the importance of care in creating social injustice in contemporary societies is underestimated in mainstream sociology (Lynch et al, 2021). Taking a care-ethical approach, these scholars argue that care relations are different from other systems of social relations, because they operate under an ethic of other-centeredness (Lynch et al, 2021; Williams, 2018). Care involves a distinct set of social relations with its own logic: it cannot be completely marketised and commodified or withdrawn (Lynch et al, 2021).…”

“…Taking a care-ethical approach, these scholars argue that care relations are different from other systems of social relations, because they operate under an ethic of other-centeredness (Lynch et al, 2021; Williams, 2018). Care involves a distinct set of social relations with its own logic: it cannot be completely marketised and commodified or withdrawn (Lynch et al, 2021). Thus, a key question is how the ‘caring self’ is produced and constrained in a context of devaluation and heightened rationalisation (Brown & Korczynski, 2017).…”