Capacity management by global shipping alliances: findings from a game experiment

Abstract

The present article uses game experiments to understand the dynamics of oligopolistic competition in liner shipping markets. We show how a limited number of carriers, interacting over time, acting independently or grouped into global shipping alliances, are able to effectively and jointly reduce excess capacity. A serious game (called TRALIN) has been designed to this end, mimicking the global liner shipping market where four to five global shipping alliances compete on a set of 12 routes, connecting four ports of call for a few sequential voyages. Carriers are initially subject to low profits due to overcapacity and have to anticipate competitor capacity decisions and vessel deployment simultaneously. Results from 18 experimental games with 4644 decisions were collected and statistically analysed to confirm the main tenets of oligopoly theory and to highlight the existence of a learning effect from successive interactions (rounds in games). Our results suggest that a 'coordinated' reduction in capacity is more likely to occur when the number of competitors is limited, but even more when excessive capacity is high, urging the need for cooperation; a learning effect amongst market participants is detected over time. Serious games are flexible tools for improving our understanding of competition, the organization of liner shipping networks, and the role played by global shipping alliances. This tool may help practitioners to understand how over-capacity is evolving within the competitive process, and what factors may influence it. Although voluntarily made simplistic for the purpose of experiments, our design allows one to focus on the main tenets of oligopoly theory as applied to shipping markets.

Global trends in maritime and port economics: the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond

“… 3 See Cariou and Guillotreau ( 2021 ) for a detailed game-theoretic analysis of capacity management strategies in the liner shipping industry. …”

Konteyner Taşimacilik İtti̇faklari

“…Modern konteyner birlikleri Kıta Avrupa'sına olan rotalarda ortaya çıkmış, 1996 yılında zirve yapmış ve 2008 yılında FEFC (-Far East Freight Conference-Uzak Doğu Taşımacılık Birliği)'nin feshedilmesinin ardından sonlanmıştır (Hirata, 2017). Yaklaşık yüz yılı aşkın bir süre faaliyet gösteren konteyner birliklerinin ortadan kalkmasındaki en büyük etkenlerden biri de ABD'de 1990'lı yıllarda ve Avrupa'da 2008 yılında konteyner birliklerine uygulanan anti-tröst yasalarına olan muafiyetin ortadan kalkması olmuştur (Cariou & Guillotreau, 2021). Bu gelişmeler Tablo 1'de özetlenmektedir.…”

“…Hangi geminin hangi limana ne zaman uğrayacağı önceden hazırlanmış olan sefer programlarıyla belirlenmiştir. Konteyner taşıyıcıları bu işi bireysel kurum olarak veya stratejik ittifaklar yoluyla yürütmektedirler (Plum vd., 2014;Tang & Sun, 2018;Cariou & Guillotreau, 2021). Stratejik ittifaklar firmalar arasında işbirliği şeklinde kurulan ve ittifak ortaklarına, firmanın bireysel çabasıyla karşılaştırıldığında, sinerjinin de etkisiyle daha fazla yarar sağlayan oluşumlardır.…”

A Study on the Han-Hai Fleet Slot Mutual Chartering Model of Han-Shen Line Based on Linear Alliance

“…Cariou and Cuillotreau's study argues that alliances can be effective in addressing the problem of overcapacity, noting that alliances can play a greater role in reducing overcapacity when the number of competitors is limited. They point out that when the number of competitors is limited, alliances can play a greater role in reducing overcapacity (Cariou 2021).…”