Canada – Wheat: discrimination, non-commercial considerations, and the right to regulate through state trading enterprises

Hoekman, Bernard; Trachtman, Joel P.

doi:10.1017/s1474745607003643

Cited by 28 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 7 publications

(9 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As a government agency, the CWB was not necessarily maximizing profits (Hoekman and Trachtman ). While the theoretical possibility of manipulating export markets existed, in practice the CWB was established for public policy purposes, including income redistribution to achieve equity and to generate political support for the continuation of the agency's powers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deregulation and regional specialization: Evidence from Canadian agriculture

Carter

Ferguson

2019

Canadian J of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For about 70 years, the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) was one of the world's largest export "single desk" state traders in agriculture, until it was deregulated in 2012 and stripped of its marketing powers. One of the main crops controlled by the CWB was barley. We estimate the impact of the removal of the CWB's single desk on the spatial pattern of malting barley production in Western Canada. We find that deregulation encouraged growers located closer to malt barley processing plants to increase production relative to growers located further from the plants. This change in cropping patterns after deregulation can be explained by efficiency gains, combined with transportation and handling cost savings.Résumé. Dérégulation et spécialisation régionale : l'exemple de l'agriculture canadienne. Pendant près de soixante-dix ans, la Commission canadienne du blé (CCB) représenta l'un des plus grands guichets uniques monopolistiques de négoce agricole dans le monde jusqu'à sa déréglementation en 2012, date à laquelle elle perdit toutes ses prérogatives commerciales. L'une des principales cultures contrôlées par la CCB était l'orge. Nous avons évalué l'impact de la suppression du guichet unique de la CCB sur la distribution géographique de la production d'orge de brasserie dans l'Ouest canadien. Consécutivement à la déréglementation, nous avons remarqué que plus les producteurs étaient situés à proximité des usines de transformation d'orge brassicole, plus ils augmentaient leur production. Ce changement dans le système de culture, postérieur à la déréglementation, peut s'expliquer par des gains en efficacité ainsi que des économies en matière de coûts de transport et de manutention.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deregulation and regional specialization: Evidence from Canadian agriculture

Carter

Ferguson

2019

Canadian J of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

The Empirical Landscape of Trade Policy

Bown

Crowley

2016

Handbook of Commercial Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This chapter surveys empirically the broad features of trade policy in goods for 31 major economies that collectively represented 83 percent of the world's population and 91 percent of the world's GDP in 2013. We address five questions: Do some countries have more liberal trading regimes than others? Within countries, which industries receive the most import protection? How do trade policies change over time? Do countries discriminate among their trading partners when setting trade policy? Finally, how liberalized is world trade? Our analysis documents the extent of cross-sectional heterogeneity in applied commercial policy across countries, their economic sectors, and their trading partners, over time. We conclude that substantial trade policy barriers remain as an important feature of the world economy.

show abstract