Evidence suggests that while explicit evaluations of others are easily formed and equally easily changed, implicit evaluations are more intransigent. The present research investigated the role of individual and situational differences in determining whether explicit and implicit evaluations are changed in light of new information. In three studies, participants formed implicit and explicit evaluations of two groups before learning new information that objectively contradicted those evaluations. In Experiment 1, individuals characterized by a greater Personal Need for Structure (PNS) formed more extreme explicit evaluations but were also more likely to reverse them later. In contrast, whilst higher PNS individuals also formed more extreme implicit preferences, they were less likely to change them in response to new information. In Experiments 2a and 2b, the opportunity to re-assess the same evidence on which initial impressions were formed was essential to revising implicit evaluations, but was less important for changing explicit evaluations. These results confirm that differences in motivation and opportunity to engage in elaborative processing moderate the revision of implicit, but not explicit, group preferences.Keywords: implicit vs. explicit preferences, elaboration, personal need for structure 3 Easier Done than Undone… by Some of the People, Some of the Time:
The Role of Elaboration in Explicit and Implicit Group Preferences
You can't teach an old dog new tricks. A leopard never changes its spots. He's just awolf in sheep's clothing. Our language is replete with clichés that suggest that human nature is fixed, and that we should be sceptical of anyone who tries to convince us that their true character has really changed. Empirically, it seems that we take these clichés to heart -at least at an implicit level. Although social perceivers may be willing to acknowledge in their explicit reports that people can change, they may have difficulty overcoming mental associations with such people that tell them that no change has taken place. For example, Mary might learn about Jack, a violent gang member who spent 10 years in prison and came out a new and rehabilitated man. Mary might profess a belief that Jack is now harmless and not involved in crime, but may still feel immediately afraid and clutch her purse when she encounters Jack in a dark alley at night.Why don't our implicit evaluations always change in line with our explicit preferences? Numerous theories have been proposed to account for discrepancies between implicit and explicit evaluations. Research and theory over the past 30 years has promoted the idea that cognitive processing can be classified into at least two types: relatively automatic processes that draw on associative networks, versus relatively controlled processes that draw on explicit knowledge. Such dual process models are currently prevalent in social psychology (see Petty, Tormala, Brinol, & Jarvis, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000...