Social identity theory predicts that perceivers strongly identified with an in-group will maximize the distinction and maintain a clear boundary between their own and other groups by categorizing others' membership accurately. Two experiments tested the prediction that racially prejudiced individuals, who presumably identify highly with their racial in-group, are more motivated to make accurate racial categorizations than nonprejudiced individuals. Results indicated that prejudiced participants not only took longer to categorize race-ambiguous targets (Experiments 1 and 2), but also made more nonverbal vocalizations when presented with them (Experiment 1), suggesting response hesitation. The results support the hypothesis that, compared to nonprejudiced individuals, prejudiced individuals concern themselves with accurate identification of in-group and out-group members and use caution when making racial categorizations. The basic hypothesis, then, is that pressures to evaluate one's own group positively through in-group/out-group comparisons lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other. Tajfel & Turner (1986, p. 16) Individuals claim membership in numerous social groups. Indeed, the particular groups to which one belongs influence selfperceptions, including self-evaluation. Individuals often identify and define themselves in terms of their group memberships; for example, one identifies oneself as a college professor, a woman, or a Catholic. Membership in positively valued social groups generally enhances self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Groups may be positively valued in either an absolute or a relative sense. Positive value in an absolute sense occurs when the group achieves something culturally valued or at least valued by group members. Members share in the in-group's positive value in terms of their perceptions of both themselves and others. Supporting research has demonstrated that individuals are more likely to identify themselves verbally and nonverbally as a group member after a positive group experience (e.g., identifying oneself as a New Yorker after a Yankees World Series victory; Cialdini et al., 1976). Groups may also take on positive value in a relative sense,

Two experiments investigated the conditions under which previously suppressed stereotypes are applied in impression formation. In Experiment 1, the extent to which a previously suppressed racial stereotype influenced subsequent impressions depended on the race of the target who was subsequently encountered. Whereas impressions of race-unspecified targets were assimilated to the stereotype following its suppression, no such effects were observed when the target belonged to the racial group whose stereotype had been initially suppressed. These results demonstrate that when perceivers are motivated to avoid stereotyping individuals, the influence of a stereotype that has been previously activated through suppression is minimized. Experiment 2 demonstrated that these processing goals effectively reduce the impact of suppression-activated stereotypes only when perceivers have sufficient capacity to enact the goals. These results suggest that both sufficient motivation and capacity are necessary to prevent heightened stereotyping following stereotype suppression

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Attempts to suppress social stereotypes often lead to an increase in the accessibility of those stereotypes, thereby increasing stereotypic influences on subsequent social judgments. The present research sought to determine whether such suppression effects occur in relatively naturalistic situations. Participants in Experiment 1 wrote a story about a typical day in the life of an African-American target person after receiving one of two sets of instructions. Participants in the control condition were simply told to write whatever they wanted. Participants in the spontaneous suppression condition were informed that the study was being conducted by an African-American political group. The results indicated that participants in the spontaneous suppression condition wrote less stereotypic stories than did those in the control condition. Participants in Experiment 2 first rated their attitudes toward African Americans under one of three conditions: a directed suppression condition, a spontaneous suppression condition, and a no suppression-control condition. In a subsequent task, participants formed an impression of a target person who behaved in an ambiguously hostile manner. The results indicated that participants in both the directed suppression and the spontaneous suppression conditions judged the target person to be significantly more hostile (i.e., stereotypic of African Americans) than did participants in the control condition. These results indicate that there are situational factors which motivate spontaneous stereotype-suppression attempts, leading to later increases in stereotype use

Evidence suggests that while explicit evaluations of others are easily formed and equally easily changed, implicit evaluations are more intransigent. The present research investigated the role of individual and situational differences in determining whether explicit and implicit evaluations are changed in light of new information. In three studies, participants formed implicit and explicit evaluations of two groups before learning new information that objectively contradicted those evaluations. In Experiment 1, individuals characterized by a greater Personal Need for Structure (PNS) formed more extreme explicit evaluations but were also more likely to reverse them later. In contrast, whilst higher PNS individuals also formed more extreme implicit preferences, they were less likely to change them in response to new information. In Experiments 2a and 2b, the opportunity to re-assess the same evidence on which initial impressions were formed was essential to revising implicit evaluations, but was less important for changing explicit evaluations. These results confirm that differences in motivation and opportunity to engage in elaborative processing moderate the revision of implicit, but not explicit, group preferences.Keywords: implicit vs. explicit preferences, elaboration, personal need for structure 3 Easier Done than Undone… by Some of the People, Some of the Time: The Role of Elaboration in Explicit and Implicit Group Preferences You can't teach an old dog new tricks. A leopard never changes its spots. He's just awolf in sheep's clothing. Our language is replete with clichés that suggest that human nature is fixed, and that we should be sceptical of anyone who tries to convince us that their true character has really changed. Empirically, it seems that we take these clichés to heart -at least at an implicit level. Although social perceivers may be willing to acknowledge in their explicit reports that people can change, they may have difficulty overcoming mental associations with such people that tell them that no change has taken place. For example, Mary might learn about Jack, a violent gang member who spent 10 years in prison and came out a new and rehabilitated man. Mary might profess a belief that Jack is now harmless and not involved in crime, but may still feel immediately afraid and clutch her purse when she encounters Jack in a dark alley at night.Why don't our implicit evaluations always change in line with our explicit preferences? Numerous theories have been proposed to account for discrepancies between implicit and explicit evaluations. Research and theory over the past 30 years has promoted the idea that cognitive processing can be classified into at least two types: relatively automatic processes that draw on associative networks, versus relatively controlled processes that draw on explicit knowledge. Such dual process models are currently prevalent in social psychology (see Petty, Tormala, Brinol, & Jarvis, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000...