Can We See Natural Kind Properties?

Jagnow, René

doi:10.5840/eps201544217

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Indeed, what is further perceptually grasped in passing from the experience of loworderl properties that a novice entertains to the experience of highorder properties that an expert entertains is not the property of being a pine tree, as Siegel maintains in her application of her method of phenomenal contrast to this case. Instead, it is a grouping property, i.e., that of being a pine-like configuration (Jagnow 2015). This is the twinearthable property that would also be perceptually grasped in a similar Twin-Earth phenomenally shifting situation.…”

Section: Facial Properties As Both High-order and Perceivable Propertiesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Perception of Faces and Other Progressively Higher-Order Properties

Calzavarini

Voltolini

2022

Topoi

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On the basis of a new criterion for a property to be perceivable–a property is perceivable iff it is not only given immediately and non-volitionally, but also grasped via a holistic form of attention–in this paper we will claim that not only facial properties, but other high-order properties located in a hierarchy of high-order properties, notably gender and racial properties, are perceivable as well. Such claims will be both theoretically and empirically justified.

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Section: Facial Properties As Both High-order and Perceivable Propertiesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Perception of Faces and Other Progressively Higher-Order Properties

Calzavarini

Voltolini

2022

Topoi

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“…One popular hypothesis is that phenomenal difference arises due to representing a kind property that is irreducible to lower‐level properties (Siegel, ; Bayne, ) . On the other hand, it is a common claim that the R‐property responsible for change in phenomenal character is identical to one of the lower‐level properties like those connected with size, colour, spatial position, and shape (Connolly, ; Briscoe, ; Jagnow, ).…”

Section: Kind Properties and Reducibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When a person learns to perceptually recognize pine trees, she or he starts to focus attention on different parts of a tree. By virtue of these variations, some elements of shape are represented in a more detailed way, while others, which are outside the focus of attention, receive only a rudimentary representation (Pacherie, ; Prinz, ; Price, ; Briscoe, ; Jagnow, ).…”

Section: Kind Properties and Reducibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual Kinds as Supervening Sortals

Skrzypulec

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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It seems intuitive that in situations of perceptual recognition, additional properties are represented. While much has been written about the significance of such properties for perceptual phenomenology, it is still unclear (a) what the relation between recognition-based properties and lower-level perceptual properties is and (b) whether it is justified to classify them as kind properties. Relying on results in cognitive psychology, I argue that recognition-based properties (I) are irreducible, high-level properties, and (II) are kind properties by virtue of being sortal properties but (III) supervene on lower-level properties and so are unlikely to be natural kind properties.

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Aftereffects, High-Levelism and Gestalt Properties

Başoğlu

2024

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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According to high-levelism, one can perceptually be aware of high-level properties such as natural kind properties. Against high-levelism, the Gestalt proposal suggests that instead of high-level properties, one can have a perceptual experience as of Gestalt properties, i.e., determinables of determinate low-level properties. When one looks at a bird, the high-levelist argues that one can perceive the property of being a bird, and the proponent of the Gestalt proposal argues that one first perceives the property of having the bird Gestalt (shared by all and only birds) and only post-perceptually recognizes that it is a bird. In the present study, to resolve the dispute between high-levelism and the Gestalt proposal, I aim to test their abilities to explain the attribution of multiple perceptible properties to the same object by making use of various empirical studies on high-level aftereffects. I conclude that the Gestalt proposal fails the test and hence shall not be a viable alternative to high-levelism.

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Can We See Natural Kind Properties?

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Perception of Faces and Other Progressively Higher-Order Properties

Perception of Faces and Other Progressively Higher-Order Properties

Perceptual Kinds as Supervening Sortals

Aftereffects, High-Levelism and Gestalt Properties

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