Perception of Faces and Other Progressively Higher-Order Properties

Calzavarini, Fabrizio; Voltolini, Alberto

doi:10.1007/s11245-022-09802-4

Topoi

2022

DOI: 10.1007/s11245-022-09802-4

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Perception of Faces and Other Progressively Higher-Order Properties

Fabrizio Calzavarini

Alberto Voltolini

Abstract: On the basis of a new criterion for a property to be perceivable–a property is perceivable iff it is not only given immediately and non-volitionally, but also grasped via a holistic form of attention–in this paper we will claim that not only facial properties, but other high-order properties located in a hierarchy of high-order properties, notably gender and racial properties, are perceivable as well. Such claims will be both theoretically and empirically justified.

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2023

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Cited by 2 publications

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The Different Bases of the Meaning and of the Seeing-in Experiences

Calzavarini

Voltolini

2023

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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There are some complex experiences, such as the experiences that allow us to understand linguistic expressions and pictures respectively, which seem to be very similar. For they are stratified experiences in which, on top of grasping certain low-level properties, one also grasps some high-level semantic-like properties. Yet first of all, those similarities notwithstanding, a phenomenologically-based reflection shows that such experiences are different. For a meaning experience has a high-level fold, in which one grasps the relevant expression’s meaning, which is not perceptual, but is only based on a low-level perceptual fold that merely grasps that expression in its acoustically relevant properties. While a pictorial experience, a seeing-in experience, has two folds, the configurational and the recognitional fold, in which one respectively grasps the physical basis of a picture, its vehicle, and what the picture presents, its subject, that are both perceptual, insofar as they are intimately connected. For unlike a meaning experience, in a seeing-in experience one can perceptually read off the picture’s subject from the picture’s vehicle. Moreover, this phenomenological difference is neurologically implemented. For not only the cerebral areas that respectively implement such experiences are different, at least as far as the access to those experiences’ respective high-level content is concerned. As is shown by the fact that one can selectively be impaired in the area respectively implementing the meaning vs. the seeing-in experience without losing one’s pictorial vs. semantic competence respectively. But also, unlike meaning experiences, the area implementing the seeing-in experiential folds is perceptual as a whole. For not only a picture’s subject can be accessed earlier than an expression’s meaning, but also the neural underpinnings of such folds are located in the perceptual areas of the brain.

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The Different Bases of the Meaning and of the Seeing-in Experiences

Calzavarini

Voltolini

2023

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Perceiving Aesthetic Properties

Voltolini

2023

British Journal of Aesthetics

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In this paper, I want to claim that, in conformity with overall intuitions, there are some aesthetic properties that are perceivable. For they are high-level properties that are not only grasped immediately, but also attended to holistically—just like the grouping properties they depend on and that are responsible for the Gestalt effects or switches through which they are grasped. Yet, unlike such grouping properties, they are holistically attended to in a disinterested modality, where objects and their properties are regarded for their own sake.

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Perception of Faces and Other Progressively Higher-Order Properties

Cited by 2 publications

References 81 publications

The Different Bases of the Meaning and of the Seeing-in Experiences

The Different Bases of the Meaning and of the Seeing-in Experiences

Perceiving Aesthetic Properties

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