Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

Cinyabuguma, Matthias; Page, Talbot; Putterman, Louis

doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z

Cited by 220 publications

(208 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…High degrees of cooperation, however, are not observed throughout in public-good games with punishment (Nikiforakis and Normann, 2007). In the punishment experiments, sometimes the "wrong" players get punished (Cinyabuguma et al, 2006). This is consistent with our data where the high-output firm is more likely (to attempt) to exclude another firm.…”

Section: Closed Buyer Groupssupporting

confidence: 90%

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Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Normann

Rösch

Schultz

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups purchase inputs more economically. In a repeated game, abandoning the buyer group altogether or excluding single firms constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using three-firm Cournot markets to test these predictions and other effects like how buyer groups affect outcomes when group members can communicate.The experimental results show that buyer groups lead to lower outputs when groups can exclude single firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition.JEL Classification: C7, C9, L4, L41

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Section: Closed Buyer Groupssupporting

confidence: 90%

“…In Baseline, the input price was 10 throughout. 8 We further described that subjects had the option to "join a buyer group" and how this choice affected their production cost. Next, we described the quantity decision.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Normann

Rösch

Schultz

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…When there was an opportunity to directly reward or punish the players who punished in previous rounds, they were actually given less rewards and more punishment than the people who did not punish; these results were not always significant but they were consistent across three experiments (Kyonari and Barclay 2008). In an experiment by Cinyabuguma et al (2006) where each round of PGG was followed by two rounds of punishment, first stage punishers attracted more, not less, second stage punishment. (It should be noted that some of the second stage punishment in this latter study could be due to revenge; however, revenge is not a possible explanation for the results of Kyonari and Barclay.…”

Section: Reasons For and Against Prescriptive Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating the Regulation

Strimling¹,

Eriksson²

2014

Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas

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Rules about punishment dictate how one must behave to ensure that one's punishment behavior is not met with social disapproval. These rules can be both prescriptive, telling us when we have to punish and how much we must punish at a minimum, and restrictive, telling us when we cannot punish or what the maximum punishment can be. In this chapter we investigate the general features of these rules, focusing on punishment of norm violations in social dilemmas. Researchers have often viewed the provision of punishment as a costly public good that must itself be enforced, creating a second order social dilemma that requires prescriptive norms for people to "cooperate", i.e., to punish. We argue that this is a misunderstanding of the nature of punishment and go through theoretical reasons for why prescriptive rules about punishment might not be important. Instead, we discuss the reasons that restrictive norms could benefit the group and review experiments where this is shown to be the case. Finally we report the results of four surveys that use real world situations to assess people's views about punishment in several countries. We find that punishment behavior is regulated by generally agreed upon views (i.e., norms), which are largely restrictive rather than prescriptive.Results show a strong consistency across scenarios and countries, indicating that these norms follow general principles.

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“…As for punishment types, there are many studies finding not only various unconditional punishing behaviors, but also counter-punishing behaviors. For instance, anti-social punishers impose a fine on cooperators (e.g., Cinyabuguma et al 2006, Herrmann et al 2008. Moreover, when some low cooperators are punished by high cooperators, they anti-socially retaliate against the high cooperators, given a counter-punishing opportunity 2 (e.g., Nikiforakis 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conditional punishment

Kamei¹

2014

Economics Letters

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Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

Cited by 220 publications

References 13 publications

Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?

Regulating the Regulation

Conditional punishment

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