Can robots be responsible moral agents? And why should we care?

Sharkey, Amanda J. C.

doi:10.1080/09540091.2017.1313815

Cited by 24 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 16 publications

(11 reference statements)

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“…From the academic domain a variety of scholars in the fields of ethics and technology and/or robot ethics have argued against the development of AMAs (Bryson 2008; Johnson and Miller 2008; Sharkey 2017; Tonkens 2009). What is currently missing from the debate on AMAs is a closer look at the reasons offered (to society, academics, the media) by machine ethicists to justify the development of AMAs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents

Wynsberghe

Robbins

2018

Sci Eng Ethics

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Many industry leaders and academics from the field of machine ethics would have us believe that the inevitability of robots coming to have a larger role in our lives demands that robots be endowed with moral reasoning capabilities. Robots endowed in this way may be referred to as artificial moral agents (AMA). Reasons often given for developing AMAs are: the prevention of harm, the necessity for public trust, the prevention of immoral use, such machines are better moral reasoners than humans, and building these machines would lead to a better understanding of human morality. Although some scholars have challenged the very initiative to develop AMAs, what is currently missing from the debate is a closer examination of the reasons offered by machine ethicists to justify the development of AMAs. This closer examination is especially needed because of the amount of funding currently being allocated to the development of AMAs (from funders like Elon Musk) coupled with the amount of attention researchers and industry leaders receive in the media for their efforts in this direction. The stakes in this debate are high because moral robots would make demands on society; answers to a host of pending questions about what counts as an AMA and whether they are morally responsible for their behavior or not. This paper shifts the burden of proof back to the machine ethicists demanding that they give good reasons to build AMAs. The paper argues that until this is done, the development of commercially available AMAs should not proceed further.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents

Wynsberghe

Robbins

2018

Sci Eng Ethics

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“…While it would be unfair and unproductive to raise the bar for the purposes of backward-looking accountability, a bar I have argued is already more reliably reached by robots, we should raise it for forward-looking purposes, at least for humans. Concerning membership into the larger moral community, Amanda Sharkey's proposal [8] for the prioritization of safety may be better-headed. We need, first and foremost, safe humans, safe pets, and safe robots.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Contrary to the prevailing view that robots cannot be full-blown members of the larger human moral community, 7 I argue not only that they can but that they would be ideal moral agents according to our moral responsibility standards. While it is true that robots fail to meet a number of criteria which some human agents meet or which all human agents could in theory meet, 8 they earn a perfect score as far as the conception of behavioristic moral agency at work in our moral responsibility system goes. Although an agent must be substantively responsible to deserve our moral responsibility responses (in terms of properly identifying with their motives, e.g.…”

Section: Clarifying the Claimsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See[5] for a proposal of a rule-based (Kantian) machine. See[6] and[7] for an optimistic view of programmable ethics and[8] for a pessimistic one.3 He acknowledges the inadequacy of this minimal conception of morality, but sees "considerable merit" in it as well[10:5] 4. The negative reactive attitudes), in first terms, are reactions to the disappointment of the expectations to which we hold all non-exempt (highly abnormal or immature) agents (cf.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I refer here specifically to overt acts or expressions of blame, praise, etc., not to private, mental acts.7 See[15] and[16] for the view of robots as in an "in-between position" -neither instruments nor moral subjects. See[17] and[8] for views against robotic moral agency.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Robots as Ideal Moral Agents per the Moral Responsibility System

Gogoshin

2020

Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications

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Contrary to the prevailing view that robots cannot be full-blown members of the larger human moral community, I argue not only that they can but that they would be ideal moral agents in the way that currently counts. While it is true that robots fail to meet a number of criteria which some human agents meet or which all human agents could in theory meet, they earn a perfect score as far as the behavioristic conception of moral agency at work in our moral responsibility practices goes.

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