Can Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization

Abstract

This article outlines the logic and consequences of the classical theory of electoral governance. By empowering the executive with the administration of elections and the legislature with the certification of the vote tally, the theory expected elected officials to generate widely acceptable election results. This article argues that the classical theory breaks down when the same party controls the executive and the legislature. Developments in several presidential systems offer tentative support for its central hypothesis. Only when parties delegated election governance to an autonomous court system did election conflicts stop promoting political instability. Comparisons between US and Latin American separation of power systems also suggest that political developments in North and South America are much more similar than commonly assumed.

Perceptions of Electoral Fairness and Voter Turnout

“…However, a growing body of work, building on the insights of those involved in the field of electoral assistance and observation, has analyzed the importance of confidence in electoral processes in new and emerging democracies, and it is in this context that this literature has seen the most growth in recent years (e.g., Birch, 2007Birch, , 2008Elklit & Reynolds, 2002, 2005Hartlyn & McCoy, 2006;Lehoucq, 2003, p. 252;Mozaffar, 2002;Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002;Schedler, 2002aSchedler, , 2002bSchedler, , 2006. As Fabrice Lehoucq (2002) argues, electoral malpractice "undermines [citizens'] ability to constrain the actions of state officials. .…”

Elections as a conflict processing mechanism

“…Without loss of generality, the mid-point between the 5 The approach also differs from several models of dynamic bargaining, in which p is taken as fixed and the winner of the current election either unilaterally chooses the electoral platform (as in Alesina (1988) as well as Dixit et al (2000), where there is no rebellion alternative). 6 For different "menus of manipulation," see Posada-Carbó (2000), Mozaffar and Schedler (2002), Lehoucq (2002) and Hyde (2011). 7 Other specifications exhibit the same pattern.…”

Measuring Governance Institutions' Success in Ghana: The Case of the Electoral Commission, 1993–2008

“…(Goodwin-Gill 1994:80) This presupposes that the more independent the electoral court, the greater the likelihood that political parties would channel post-electoral conflicts through it (Eisenstadt 2002). Without doubt, only when democratic governments and political parties agree to delegate election governance to an autonomous court system will election conflicts stop promoting political instability in Africa such as Nigeria, Cote D' Ivoire, Kenya (Lehoucq 2002).…”