Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political Tribalism? The Struggle for Land and Nation in Kenya

In-Migrants and Exclusion in East African Rangelands: Access, Tenure and Conflict

“…Hundreds died, 2 and tens or even hundreds of thousands were displaced (Klopp 2001). While one widespread perception sees this violent conflict as a reaction to in-migration creating and exacerbating land shortages (Galaty 1999), there is considerable evidence to suggest that much of this violence was deliberately orchestrated to undermine multiparty elections and allow leading politicians to retain a monopoly on power (Klopp 2001(Klopp , 2002Dietz 1996;cf. Fratkin 2001).…”

“…There was a strong political and economic dimension: violence was primarily targeted at multi-ethnic communities of smallholders, and benefited large landowners and supporters of the regime of the then president of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi. Throughout Narok, violence hit Kikuyu and Kipsigis smallholders, while non-Maasai land barons were not affected: class and political clientage, rather than ethnicity, were the real determinants (Klopp 2001). Major tensions erupted among the Maasai, with 'the unthinkable: physical conflict between those in the privileged relation of age-set sponsorship, and cursing of elders by juniors' (Galaty 1994: 112).…”

“…Colonial indirect rule was established in the early twentieth century with appointed chiefs, initiating an alternative legal system and hierarchy of power. As the incoming colonial administration took over land for white settler use, Kenya Maasai were moved (voluntarily or by force) from Laikipia and other northern rangelands and concentrated into the then Southern Masai Reserve, now Narok and Kajiado Districts (Waller 1988;Anderson 2002;Klopp 2001). The colonial administration classed this as:…”

“…The colonial designation of a Maasai reserve imposed clear spatial and social boundaries where more fluid interactions had prevailed. It placed control over allocation of what had been communal land in the hands of colonially appointed Maasai chiefs and local Maasai leaders as well as the district and provincial administration (Klopp 2001). Trust land was, and is, meant to be managed in the interests of customary users, avoiding alienation among other outcomes (OkothOgendo 2000).…”

“…Galaty 1999). The conflicts by no means followed simple ethnic lines (Klopp 2002). There was a strong political and economic dimension: violence was primarily targeted at multi-ethnic communities of smallholders, and benefited large landowners and supporters of the regime of the then president of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi.…”