Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers

Abstract

This article: • Contributes to the development of academic research on the internal dynamics of the Conservative Party under the leadership of David Cameron. • Contributes to the development of academic research on the processes of ministerial selection within British Government. • Contributes to the development of academic research on cohort effects within parties, and the analysis of comparisons and differences between different parliamentary cohorts. • Contributes to the development of academic research on the constraints upon Prime Ministerial power when in coalition. This article identifies the ideological composition of the parliamentary Conservative party (PCP) in order to determine the location and numeric strength of the critics of Cameron. By constructing a data set of attitudes across two ideological divides-the social, sexual and morality divide and the European divide-the article identifies the following. First, despite Cameron's social liberal emphasis both the PCP and his ministerial team is predominantly Thatcherite-i.e. socially conservative. Second, despite numerically having a Eurosceptic PCP and ministerial team, with Europhilia now an inconsequential rump, Cameron faces a minority 'hard' Eurosceptic faction of rebels who oppose his 'soft' Euroscepticism. Third, the influx of new parliamentarians elected in 2010 may increase social liberal strength, but they are overwhelmingly Eurosceptic, with a significant tranche of hard Eurosceptics amongst them. Finally, through a process of ideological mapping of these two ideological divides the research identifies a core of 50 socially conservative and hard Eurosceptics who are the critics of Cameron.

Rhetorical style and issue emphasis within the conference speeches of UKIP’s Nigel Farage 2010–2014

“…This contributed to increasing internal disagreements about the need for and the timing of a referendum on continued European Union membership (and the debates on renegotiation). Many Conservative parliamentarians on the 'hard' Eurosceptic wing of the party, also shared doubts about the socially liberal agenda of Cameron, most notably his prioritising of gay marriage (Heppell, 2013).…”

All Brexiteers now? Brexit, the Conservatives and party change

“…These figures differ slightly from those of Heppell et al (2017, p. 9) In their studies of how Conservative MPs voted in the referendum, neither Heppell et al (2017) nor Moore (2017) directly test the effect of earlier Eurosceptic positions on MPs' voting decisions. Heppell et al do show that Euroscepticism was more prevalent in the Conservative Party, but their differentiation between 'soft' and 'hard' Eurosceptics is based upon a 2011 parliamentary vote on an EU referendum (Heppell 2013). However, as explained below, it is problematic to assume that all 81 who supported this motion were Brexiteers or that this represented the totality of hard Eurosceptic opinion.…”

Ministerial Selection and Portfolio Allocation in the Cameron Government

“…This could be dismissed as inconsequential as the overall ideological disposition of the ministerial ranks remained almost identical, i.e. hard Eurosceptics are not represented within ministerial ranks, and social conservatives (who tend to be older and more experienced) are slightly over represented within ministerial ranks, relative to the PCP as a whole (Heppell, 2013).…”

“…Of the ideological divides that define contemporary British Conservatism Cameron is part of the majority on the European divide, with his brand of soft Eurosceptism serving as the majority over the hard Eurosceptics within the PCP. However, on the moral divide the social conservative opponents of Cameron outnumber his socially liberal faction (for numeric details on the ideological balances within the 2010 PCP, see Heppell, 2013).…”