Cadre recruitment and corruption: what goes wrong?

Abstract

Why do so many corrupt officials rise up in the Chinese official hierarchy in the first place? This paper addresses this question by looking at corruption in the cadre recruitment system as a source of the problem. It attempts to show that despite meaningful reforms to improve cadre recruitment, especially through greater input and supervision from below, these reforms have not succeeded in fundamentally reshaping cadre incentives in the direction of accountability towards the below. Rather, the reforms have in many ways exacerbated incentives for opportunism and maneuvering on the part of individual officials. In explaining the new problems and failures in personnel matters, the paper places blame on incentive and structural distortions in the recruitment while also taking into consideration the realities of China's vast local variance that combine to affect enforcement and incentives for compliance.

Crowding Out Meritocracy? – Cultural Constraints in Chinese Public Human Resource Management

“…Without a concept of neutral competence, meritocracy could be seriously abused. Sun () found that meritocracy rules are just taken as formalities at local governments. In the nomination and scrutinization stage, for instance, the party secretary and the party Organization Department may set criteria tailored for a target candidate, then look for the ‘right fit’, before going through the formal procedures to legitimize the selection.…”

“…Second, consequently, at the operational level, the principle of meritocracy has repeatedly been undermined especially by those in leading positions able to exercise authority as if their views represent party policies or decisions. In other words, those universal rules of public HRM have not been well accepted and respected or strictly observed and adhered to by officials with many continuing improper and illegal practices (Burns and Wang ; Heberer and Trappel ; Sun ).…”

Does Corruption Hinder Private Businesses? Leadership Stability and Predictable Corruption in China

“…Under the local party committee, the chief and deputy chiefs of different party and government branches, legislative and political consultative bodies, state‐owned enterprises, and other public institutions also wield substantial power within each functional unit. Altogether, these key party and state cadres constitute local leadership in China (Sun ). Therefore, the local government structure in China is conducive to predictable corruption because a relatively small number of political leaders is maintained within each subnational governmental jurisdiction.…”

Corruption in China’s economic reform: a review of recent observations and explanations

“…In their view, personal relationships often serve as the basis for preferential treatment or access to valued goods, information and government positions (see [35]). In examining the failure of reforms in China's personnel recruitment, Sun [25] characterized the current political and economic systems in China as crony capitalism built on a kinship alliance.…”