‘Buying Peace’ in Chechnya: Challenges of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Public Sector

Abstract

Whereas there seems to be a consensus on the importance of social services for the success of peacebuilding efforts, the role of corruption in the public sector remains ambiguous. On the one hand, conventional interpretations of the role of corruption in the aftermath of conflict suggest that corruption impedes a successful war-to-peace transition. On the other hand, corruption may be necessary to the survival of ordinary citizens by reinforcing economic efficiency and helping them to gain access to basic social services. This article studies various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction in Chechnya with a particular focus on corruption in in the public sector. It argues that Moscow's strategy of soothing the insurgency in the North Caucasus with generous financial injections has brought some stability at least in the sense of absence of large-scale violence. Despite these seemingly positive results, sweeping corruption in the public sector is likely to undermine the effectiveness of post-conflict reconstruction and development projects in Chechnya in the long run, in this way increasing the likelihood of post-conflict Chechen society sliding back into public discontent and violence.

Agricultural abandonment and re-cultivation during and after the Chechen Wars in the northern Caucasus

“…After Russia's declaration of victory in 2009, the insurgency in Chechnya has been largely suppressed (Figure 2). Concomitantly, large reconstruction funding from the Russian federal government was given to the new government (Russell, 2011;Zabyelina, 2013). However, the focus of the reconstruction efforts was to rebuild the capital Grozny, as well as infrastructure and the petroleum industry, while the agricultural sector received less attention (IDMC, 2013).…”

“…Three years after Chechnya declared independence, Russia launched a 21-month campaign, the First Chechen War, which ended in 1996 when Russian forces withdrew and Chechnya gained de facto independence, albeit with rampant corruption, revolts, and crime (Zurcher, 2007). Furthermore, after Chechen rebels invaded Dagestan to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state, Russia responded with a new campaign in 1999, the Second Chechen War, which later transformed into a 'war on terror' against Islamic fundamentalist (Zabyelina, 2013). In 2009, the pro-Moscow Chechen government announced the end of the counter-terrorism operation, and while stability was largely reinstalled, clashes with militants and insurgencies remained common throughout the northern Caucasus (Holland et al, 2018;O'Loughlin and Witmer, 2012).…”

Illiberal peace? Authoritarian modes of conflict management

“…In Chechnya, for example, the Russian government has invested at least 14 billion US dollars in post-conflict reconstruction since 2001 (Yaffa, 2016: 75). Although such funding is primarily directed through state agencies, there is little doubt that it has also been personally controlled by members of local elite patronage networks, contributing to the construction of a single-pyramid order (Schwirtz, 2011;Zabyelina, 2013). What is labelled corruption by outsiders (almost US$700m in 2003 and US$600m in 2004 were reportedly lost from Russian budgetary allocations to Chechnya due to 'financial violations' [Hughes, 2007: 126]) is primarily a way of rewarding political loyalty in an informal vertical hierarchy of power, or -as Zabyelina (2013) frames it -a way of 'buying peace'.…”

Power ideas and conflict: ideology, linkage and leverage in Crimea and Chechnya

“…Putin, however, has not allowed the criticisms to deflect him from the policy of investing in Kadyrov. Moreover, it has been argued that both have employed corruption productively, at least in the short term, as a social "glue" to rebind the Chechen society broken by a decade of war and to enhance Kadyrov's authority (Zabyelina 2013).…”