“…An in‐depth empirical analysis is especially important because by virtue of their de jure design, one may find representatives of national ministries and representatives of more or less independent NRAs on these MBs. This could lead to different levels of accountability because, as suggested in the literature (see, for example, Egeberg, ; Egeberg and Trondal, , b; Follesdal, ; Trondal, ), representatives from national ministries possess a clearer chain of delegation and are usually more directly accountable to, and dependent on, their respective governments than representatives of more or less independent NRAs. Therefore, in order to assess how the formal inclusion of such representatives selected by the particular Member States affects the accountability of MBs, it is important to know more precisely how accountable these representatives are de facto vis‐à‐vis their home countries and their governments (Eberlein and Newman, ).…”