Building Femtocell More Secure with Improved Proxy Signature

Han, Chan-Kyu; Choi, Hyoung-Kee; Kim, In-Hwan

doi:10.1109/glocom.2009.5426223

Cited by 25 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 3 publications

(7 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…All the data to and from the femtocell travels through the secure tunnel, hence making the data more secure [76]. In [75] a number of security threats like eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attack and compromising subscriber access list have been pointed out. These threats have not been addressed sufficiently till date and thus the author proposes improved authentication and key agreement mechanism for H(e)NBs.…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Interference Management in Femtocells

Zahir

Arshad

Nakata

et al. 2013

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

323

182

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-Increase in system capacity and data rates can be achieved efficiently in a wireless system by getting the transmitter and receiver closer to each other. Femtocells deployed in the macrocell significantly improve the indoor coverage and provide better user experience. The femtocell base station called as Femtocell Access Point (FAP) is fully user deployed and hence reduces the infrastructure, maintenance and operational cost of the operator while at the same time providing good Quality of Service (QoS) to the end user and high network capacity gains. However, the mass deployment of femtocell faces a number of challenges, among which interference management is of much importance, as the fundamental limits of capacity and achievable data rates mainly depends on the interference faced by the femtocell network. To cope with the technical challenges including interference management faced by the femtocells, researchers have suggested a variety of solutions. These solutions vary depending on the physical layer technology and the specific scenarios considered. Furthermore, the cognitive capabilities, as a functionality of femtocell have also been discussed in this survey.This article summarises the main concepts of femtocells that are covered in literature and the major challenges faced in its large scale deployment. The main challenge of interference management is discussed in detail with its types in femtocells and the solutions proposed over the years to manage interference have been summarised. In addition an overview of the current femtocell standardisation and the future research direction of femtocells have also been provided.

show abstract

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Security is also required to prevent unwanted users to access a femtocell network and use the resources. This is mainly for the close access mode, where only specific users can access a femtocell [75].…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Interference Management in Femtocells

Zahir

Arshad

Nakata

et al. 2013

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

323

182

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In [8] the authors classify a number of attacks on femtocells. The attack we describe here has similarities to attack 5 (manin-the-middle) listed in [6], [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [8] the authors classify a number of attacks on femtocells. The attack we describe here has similarities to attack 5 (manin-the-middle) listed in [6], [8]. However, our attack differs in a significant way, because it is entirely passive and not foiled by authentication of the femtocell or the application of cryptography to communication between the femtocell and the MNO's network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rogue femtocell owners: How mallory can monitor my devices

Malone

Kavanagh

Murphy

2013

2013 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-Femtocells are small cellular telecommunication base stations that provide improved cellular coverage. These devices provide important improvements in coverage, battery life and throughput, they also present security challenges. We identify a problem which has not been identified in previous studies of femtocell security: rogue owners of femtocells can secretly monitor third-party mobile devices by using the femtocell's access control features. We present traffic analysis of real femtocell traces and demonstrate the ability to monitor mobile devices through classification of the femtocell's encrypted backhaul traffic. We also consider the femtocell's power usage and status LEDs as other side channels that provide information on the femtocell's operation. We conclude by presenting suitable solutions to overcome this problem.

show abstract

“…(ii) Owing to the support of many new types of base stations such as Home eNodeB (HeNB), eNB, and Relay Nodes (RNs), 3GPP committee [7,8] has addressed distinct handover procedures for different scenarios, such as the handovers between eNBs, between HeNBs, between a HeNB and an eNB, and the inter-MME handovers when the base stations are managed by different MMEs, which will increase the overall system complexity. (iii) Since some base stations such as HeNB and RNs can be easily owned by third parties, a robust mutual authentication between MDs and base stations is required in handover process to withstand several protocol attacks such as impersonation attacks, Manin-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, and replay attacks [12][13][14][15]. (iv) Due to lack of user identity and location privacy preservation, an attacker can easily trace a special MD's movement locus.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

UPPGHA: Uniform Privacy Preservation Group Handover Authentication Mechanism for mMTC in LTE-A Networks

Cao

2018

Security and Communication Networks

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Machine Type Communication (MTC), as one of the most important wireless communication technologies in the future wireless communication, has become the new business growth point of mobile communication network. It is a key point to achieve seamless handovers within Evolved-Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) for massive MTC (mMTC) devices in order to support mobility in the Long Term Evolution-Advanced (LTE-A) networks. When mMTC devices simultaneously roam from a base station to a new base station, the current handover mechanisms suggested by the Third-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) require several handover signaling interactions, which could cause the signaling load over the access network and the core network. Besides, several distinct handover procedures are proposed for different mobility scenarios, which will increase the system complexity. In this paper, we propose a simple and secure uniform group-based handover authentication scheme for mMTC devices based on the multisignature and aggregate message authentication code (AMAC) techniques, which is to fit in with all of the mobility scenarios in the LTE-A networks. Compared with the current 3GPP standards, our scheme can achieve a simple authentication process with robust security protection including privacy preservation and thus avoid signaling congestion. The correctness of the proposed group handover authentication protocol is formally proved in the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model and verified based on the AVISPA and SPAN.

show abstract

Building Femtocell More Secure with Improved Proxy Signature

Cited by 25 publications

References 3 publications

Interference Management in Femtocells

Interference Management in Femtocells

Rogue femtocell owners: How mallory can monitor my devices

UPPGHA: Uniform Privacy Preservation Group Handover Authentication Mechanism for mMTC in LTE-A Networks

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About