This paper focuses on the European governments' decision to involve unions and employers in the design and implementation of public policy. Based on new measures of the phenomenon, it argues that between 1974 and 2004 no convergence on a pluralist model of policy formation is visible. The paper then uses these measures to identify and analyze the clearest cases of adoption or demise of concertation, namely the contrasting responses of the British and Irish governments to wage policy, and of the Austrian and Italian governments to pension reform. It argues that governments are willing to share their policy-making prerogatives when they are politically weak, and when unions, while still representing a credible threat to policy implementation, have been declining in the recent past. Additionally, a combination of partisanship and policy learning reinforces the push for change.
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Policy Concertation in Europe: Understanding Government ChoiceThe literature on corporatism and policy concertation has shown a tendency to conflate a number of questions that it would be best to keep separate: (1) Why are governments willing (or unwilling in some cases) to share their policy making prerogatives with trade unions and employer associations, not just informally, by incorporating their inputs, but, formally, by setting up a bargaining table and engaging in negotiations with them over the content of public policy? Despite its massive size, most of the literature has focused so far on questions two and four, while it has been much less vocal on the other two. Possibly due to an implicit assumption of corporatist convergence (see Streeck, 2004), much of the neo-corporatist literature of the 1970s and 1980s did not systematically distinguish between the reasons motivating governments and those motivating unions and employers. Policy concertation was assumed to be a functional necessity of advanced societies (Schmitter, 1974;Lehmbruch, 1979), such that all governments would, sooner or later, want to engage in it. From this vantage point, the interesting questions were not those about the conditions in which certain governments (and not others) would develop a demand for policy concertation, but those about the conditions in which policy concertation would be supplied by the interest group system (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979;Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1982;Berger, 1981;Goldthorpe, 1984;Molina and Rhodes 2002).Another strand of research (by now probably larger than the former) dealt with the 2 macroeconomic consequences of policy concertation, especially centralized or coordinated collective bargaining (for recent analyses, see Garrett, 1998;Iversen, 1999;Traxler et al., 2001;Kenworthy, 2003;Traxler, 2003;Mares, 2006).In this paper we are interested in question number one, which we regard as analytically prior to the others. Governments, accountable to national parliaments (or directly to the electorate), are the sole institutions with a clear mandate to take binding decisions. The constitutional standing and democratic legit...