British American Tobacco and the “insidious impact of illicit trade” in cigarettes across Africa

LeGresley, Eric; Lee, Kelley; Muggli, Monique E.; Patel, Preeti; Collin, Jeff; Hurt, R. Douglas

doi:10.1136/tc.2008.025999

Cited by 69 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…This is similar to cases of collusion between tobacco manufacturers and smugglers that have been reported and documented in various other parts of the world during the same time period, including North America, Europe and Africa (Beare, 2002;Joossens & Raw, 2002;LeGresley, Lee, Muggli, Patel, Collin, & Hurt, 2008).…”

Section: The Involvement Of Tobacco Manufacturerssupporting

confidence: 56%

The Changing Role of China in the Global Illegal Cigarette Trade

Lampe

Kurti

Shen

et al. 2012

International Criminal Justice Review

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The illegal cigarette trade first emerged in the form of violations of state tobacco monopoly regulations. In the course of the restructuring of the legal tobacco sector, which occurred under external political pressure to open the Chinese market to foreign competition, an illegal cigarette industry emerged which at first primarily produced fake Chinese brand cigarettes for the domestic black market. At the same time China became a destination country for smuggled genuine Western brand cigarettes. It was only after effective crackdowns against cigarette smuggling and domestic distribution channels in the late 1990s that the Chinese illegal cigarette industry shifted to exporting large numbers of counterfeit Western brand cigarettes to black markets abroad. China's current role as a leading supplier of counterfeit cigarettes is a result of the contradictions of the economic reform process and of external licit and illicit forces that worked towards opening up the Chinese tobacco sector to the outside world.

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Section: The Involvement Of Tobacco Manufacturerssupporting

confidence: 56%

The Changing Role of China in the Global Illegal Cigarette Trade

Lampe

Kurti

Shen

et al. 2012

International Criminal Justice Review

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“…Higher per unit taxes in HICs mean that government revenue losses are significantly higher, creating a greater incentive for governments to investigate and reduce tax avoidance and evasion. Illicit trade is, however, a global problem and evidence of tobacco industry collusion in cigarette smuggling in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union has emerged via the industry's own documents that it was forced to release through litigation (Collin, LeGresley, MacKenzie, Lawrence & Lee, 2004;LeGresley et al, 2008;Nakkash & Lee, 2008). These documents show the various ways the tobacco industry use cigarette smuggling, including as a means of entering closed markets in order to establish a brand presence (Gilmore & McKee, 2004a, 2004bGilmore, Collin, & Townsend, 2007;Lee & Collin, 2006).…”

Section: Illicit Trade In Cigarettesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Price and Tax Measures and Illicit Trade in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: What We Know and What Research Is Required

Walbeek

Blecher

Gilmore

et al. 2012

Nicotine & Tobacco Research

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introduction: Article 6 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control commits Parties to use tax and price policies to reduce tobacco use, whereas Article 15 commits Parties to implement measures to eliminate the illicit trade in tobacco products. This paper identifies research gaps/needs, especially in low-and middle-income countries, which, if adequately addressed, would help in implementing Articles 6 and 15.Methods: Based on a recent comprehensive review on the impact of tax and price on tobacco consumption and a summary of reviews and narratives about the illicit tobacco market, research gaps are identified.Results: Countries have highly diverse research needs, depending on the stage of the tobacco epidemic, previous research and data availability, and making a ranking of research needs infeasible. Broad issues for further research are the following: (1) monitoring tobacco consumption, prices, and taxes, (2) assessing the effectiveness of the tax structure in generating revenue and reducing tobacco use, (3) strengthening the tax administration system in order to reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance, (4) improving our understanding of the political economy of tobacco tax policy, and (5) employing a multidisciplinary approach to assessing the magnitude of illicit tobacco trade. Conclusions:At a technical level, the case for increasing excise taxes to improve public health and increase government revenue is easily made, but the political and policy environment is often not supportive. In order to effectively impact policy, the required approach would typically make use of rigorous economic techniques, and be cognizant of the political economy of raising excise taxes. inTRoduCTionThe World Health Organization's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) sets out a number of measures that aim to reduce the demand for (Articles 6-14) and supply of tobacco (Articles 15-17). The focus of this paper is on Article 6, and to a lesser extent on Article 15. Article 6 (Box 1) commits the Parties to implement tax policies (and where appropriate, price policies) that aim to reduce tobacco consumption, while Article 15 (Box 2) aims to eliminate the illicit trade in tobacco products.As a framework treaty, the FCTC does not provide specific detail on best practices and how Parties should implement the treaty but rather leaves it to a series of Protocols and Guidelines which are negotiated at a later stage. Guidelines provide recommendations on the implementation and/or interpretation of treaty obligations while protocols are legally binding and introduce new obligations. A Protocol on the illicit trade in tobacco products has been negotiated and a working group to develop Guidelines for Article 6 has been established. Both the Protocol and the Guidelines are on the agenda for adoption at the Conference of the Parties in November 2012.Article 6 encourages the Parties to increase the tax on cigarettes, which would increase their retail prices, make cigarettes less affordable and thus discourage consumption. Since ...

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“…cheap brands versus international brands, target different market segments. Additional explanations advanced in the literature but not directly verifiable with our data include differences in level of enforcement, the presence of organized crime 6 and tobacco industry involvement in smuggling operations as a way to penetrate new markets and reduce their tax liability 31, 32, 33, 34, 35. The exception that we found in cities where the price difference was the opposite sign relative to the difference in median prices found in corresponding countries may be due to their proximity to country borders and a tax‐free zone.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 77%

An analysis of purchase price of legal and illicit cigarettes in urban retail environments in 14 low‐ and middle‐income countries

et al. 2017

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Background/AimsTo estimate and compare price differences between legal and illicit cigarettes in 14 low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMIC).DesignA cross‐sectional census of all packs available on the market was purchased.SettingCigarette packs were purchased in formal retail settings in three major cities in each of 14 LMIC: Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Vietnam.ParticipantsA total of 3240 packs were purchased (range = 58 packs in Egypt to 505 in Russia). Packs were categorized as ‘legal’ or ‘illicit’ based on the presence of a health warning label from the country of purchase and existence of a tax stamp; 2468 legal and 772 illicit packs were in the analysis.MeasurementsDescriptive statistics stratified by country, city and neighborhood socio‐economic status were used to explore the association between price and legal status of cigarettes.FindingsThe number of illicit cigarettes in the sample setting was small (n < 5) in five countries (Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia) and excluded from analysis. In the remaining nine countries, the median purchase price of legal cigarettes ranged from US$0.32 in Pakistan (n = 72) to US$3.24 in Turkey (n = 242); median purchase price of illicit cigarettes ranged from US$0.80 in Ukraine (n = 14) to US$3.08 in India (n = 41). The difference in median price between legal and illicit packs as a percentage of the price of legal packs ranged from 32% in Philippines to 455% in Bangladesh. Median purchase price of illicit cigarette packs was higher than that of legal cigarette packs in six countries (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam). Median purchase price of illicit packs was lower than that of legal packs in Turkey, Ukraine and China.ConclusionsThe median purchase price of illicit cigarettes is higher than that of legal cigarette packs in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia appear to have few or no illicit cigarettes for purchase from formal, urban retailers.

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British American Tobacco and the “insidious impact of illicit trade” in cigarettes across Africa

Cited by 69 publications

References 13 publications

The Changing Role of China in the Global Illegal Cigarette Trade

The Changing Role of China in the Global Illegal Cigarette Trade

Price and Tax Measures and Illicit Trade in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: What We Know and What Research Is Required

An analysis of purchase price of legal and illicit cigarettes in urban retail environments in 14 low‐ and middle‐income countries

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