Bringing the war home: the strategic logic of ‘North Caucasian terrorism’ in Russia

Abstract

Terrorism connected to the North Caucasus has been pervasive in Russia between 1992 and 2018. Based on an original dataset, this article presents statistics on rates of terrorist attacks outside of the North Caucasus, their geography and targets, and the tactics used. It argues that terrorism by North Caucasian insurgents has retained a strategic logic despite their conversion to radical Islamism. Accordingly, the erosion of its strategic logic was the principal factor that determined the end of North Caucasian terrorism outside of the North Caucasus as the insurgents lost sight of the political goals terrorism was meant to advance.

Terrorist risk assessment in the regions of the Russian Federation

“…However, the involvement of local elites in the fight against terrorism resulted in the fact that these regions received more political autonomy, including the right to violence for R. Kadyrov’s forces and the power to change federal laws for the benefit of local “customs” (Malashenko, 2009; Akins, 2020). Moreover, in the 2010s transfers from the federal budget, which, according to rough estimates, amounted to 80% of the North Caucasus republics, opened up wide opportunities for the growth of corruption (Klimentov, 2020). Indeed, only by improving the anti-corruption image of state and municipal government bodies, through political and information campaigns, we can achieve a significant improvement in the fight against terrorism.…”

“…Problems with legislative representation at the local, regional or federal level and the low availability of other channels for articulating interests can serve as an incentive for the radicalization of certain social groups that feel that their political rights are being infringed. For example, according to Lanskoy (2002, p. 189), “to break the developing cycle of violence, repression and reaction, Dagestan needs fair elections and public tolerance for religious differences.” Klimentov, (2020) believes that terrorism in Russia, concentrated on the North Caucasus, is a product of an environment in which there is evident or latent discontent of an identifiable and significant part of the local population with a situation where there are no adequate political mechanisms for its expression.…”

“…As for terrorism outside the North Caucasus, the attack in the St. Petersburg metro in 2017 was a crucial moment. The terrorists who committed the attack did not have operational ties with the groups in the Caucasus and were not clearly affiliated with them (Klimentov, 2020). They targeted Russia in revenge for its policies in Syria as part of a global jihad against the West (Yarlykapov, 2017).…”