Bridging the Modal Gap

Goswick, Dana

doi:10.5840/jphil2010107835

Cited by 7 publications

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“…On an alternative way to develop (ii), the distribution of matter across spacetime is mind-independent, but the carving of that distribution of matter into objects depends on our conceptual scheme. Goswick (2010) discusses an idea along these lines:…”

Section: Objections Consideredmentioning

confidence: 99%

Material objects and essential bundle theory

Barker

2017

Philos Stud

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In this paper we present a new metaphysical theory of material objects. On our theory, objects are bundles of property instances, where those properties give the nature or essence of that object. We call the theory essential bundle theory. Property possession is not analysed as bundle-membership, as in traditional bundle theories, since accidental properties are not included in the object's bundle. We have a different story to tell about accidental property possession. This move reaps many benefits. Essential bundle theory delivers a simple theory of the essential properties of material objects; an explanation of how object coincidence can arise; an actual-world ground for modal differences between coincident objects; a simple story about intrinsic properties; and a plausible account of certain ubiquitous cases of causal overdetermination.

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Section: Objections Consideredmentioning

confidence: 99%

Material objects and essential bundle theory

Barker

2017

Philos Stud

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“…because we don't have a God's eye perspective and from our perspective on Earth we can't see that the Earth is moving) this initial shock is no longer compelling. 26 For non-hylomorphic accounts of grounding modality see Bealer (2002), Camerone (2012), Elder (2004), Ellis (2009), Forbes (1985, Gibbard (1975), Goswick (2010), Hale (2002), Humberstone (1991), Hupakka, Keinanen, and Korhonen (1999), Kripke (1972), Paul (2004), Quine (1966), andSider (2003). 27 The hylomorphist rejects Bennett's (2004) gloss of the difference between (i) the sort being more fundamental and the modal properties being derived from it and (ii) the modal properties being more fundamental and the sort being derived from them.…”

Section: Hylomorphism Response-dependence and Grounding Modalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

Goswick

2018

Metaphysics

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The view that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter ("hylomorphism") can be contrasted with the more common view that ordinary objects are composed of only material parts ("matter only"). On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that (statue-shaped) object have? Does it have the modal profile of a statue, a lump, a mere aggregate? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Does a statue (matter-m + statue-form), a lump (matter-m + lump-form), and/or a mere aggregate (matter-m + mere aggregate-form) exist? I defend a novel answer to the hard question for hylomorphism. In particular, I argue that which ordinary objects exist depends, in part, on how subjects respond to the matter they encounter. I argue that, with regard to grounding the existence and modal properties of ordinary objects, response-dependent hylomorphism is superior to both matter only views and to non-response-dependent versions of hylomorphism.

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“…Most contemporary philosophers accept something close to this principle. See, e.g., Goswick : 441–42 (but cf. Elder ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Kant on Impenetrability, Touch, and the Causal Content of Perception

Marshall

2017

European J of Philosophy

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It is well known that Kant claims that causal judgments, including judgments about forces, must have an a priori basis. It is less well known that Kant claims that we can perceive the repulsive force of bodies (their impenetrability) through the sense of touch. Together, these claims present an interpretive puzzle, since they appear to commit Kant to both affirming and denying that we can have perceptions of force. My first aim is to show that both sides of the puzzle have deep roots in Kant's philosophy. My second aim is to present three potential solutions to the puzzle, and show that each faces problems.Hume famously argues for the negative thesis that we have no genuine impression of causation, power, or force. Our idea of causation, he claims, comes merely from expectations based on constant conjunctions. As most readers understand him, Kant agrees with Hume that nothing causal can be genuinely perceived, 1 albeit while providing a different positive account of causal representations.In this paper, I present a puzzle for the received reading of Kant. In outline, the puzzle is that Kant appears to both affirm and deny that we can perceive force in external things.This puzzle runs quite deep in Kant's philosophy, but its core lies in the juxtaposition of two passages. The first passage comes from Prolegomena, where Kant says:our concepts of substance, of force, of action, of reality, etc., are wholly independent of experience, [and] likewise contain no sensory appearance whatsoever, and so in fact seem to refer to things in themselves … [Moreover, t]hey contain in themselves a necessity of determination which experience never equals. (Proleg. 4:315, see also A188/B234) 2 Kant understands perception in terms of sensory appearances (e.g., A115: 'Sense represents the appearances empirically in perception'). Therefore, if the concept of force is 'wholly independent of experience', and has 'no sensory appearance whatsoever', then it would seem that we could not, strictly speaking, ever perceive force. the first application of our concepts of quantity to matter… is grounded only on that property whereby it fills a space -which, by means of the sense of feeling, provides us with the quantity and figure of something extended, and thus with the concept of a determinate object in space, which forms the basis of everything else one can say about this thing... this substance discloses its existence to us in no other way than through that sense whereby we perceive its impenetrability, namely, feeling [das Gefühl], and thus only in relation to contact (MFNS 4:510) On the natural reading of this passage, Kant is stating that we perceive the impenetrability of matter via the sense of touch. Yet impenetrability is a force, so this statement is inconsistent with the negative Humean thesis. In addition, Kant seems to say that the feeling of impenetrability grounds the application of all quantitative concepts to matter, forming the A solution to the Perceived Force Puzzle would be of interest for three additional r...

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Bridging the Modal Gap

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Material objects and essential bundle theory

Material objects and essential bundle theory

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

Kant on Impenetrability, Touch, and the Causal Content of Perception

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