Material objects and essential bundle theory

Barker, Stephen

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0990-6

Cited by 21 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…For some examples and discussions of the positives and negatives of the many variants see, inter alia, Barker and Jago (2018), Campbell (1990), Casullo (1984Casullo ( , 1988, , Hakkarainen and Keinänen (2017), Jago (2018), Maurin (2002Maurin ( , 2011, O'Leary- Hawthorne (1995), Paul (2017), Robb (2005), Simons (1994Simons ( , 1998, Ujvári (2013), and Wayne (2008). Furthermore, having instances means that types are universals.…”

Section: The Substance Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A bundle theory of words

Miller

2019

Synthese

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It has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. In this paper, I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires posting substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts of properties (such as semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical properties). I argue that this view can better account for certain phenomena than substance theories, is ontologically more parsimonious, and coheres with claims in linguistics.

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Section: The Substance Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A bundle theory of words

Miller

2019

Synthese

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“…Each material object is numerically identical to a located bundle of its essential properties. This is essential bundle theory (Barker and Jago 2017). We might understand 'located property' as something like a trope (understood as an entity not dependent on its possessor for its existence or identity); or as a complex consisting of a Platonic universal and a spacetime region.…”

Section: Modal Reduction To Essencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…One concerns the conditions under which properties form bundles. In Barker and Jago (2017), I argue that any plurality of located properties forms a bundle whenever it is grounding closed: if the plurality grounds F, then F is in the plurality. (This guarantees that things that are essentially scarlet are thereby essentially red, for example, without implying that everything is essentially such that A ∨ ¬A.)…”

Section: Modal Reduction To Essencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…(This guarantees that things that are essentially scarlet are thereby essentially red, for example, without implying that everything is essentially such that A ∨ ¬A.) For the details and replies to objections, see Barker and Jago (2017). Another issue concerns the analysis of accidental properties (which can't be accounted for in terms of bundlemembership).…”

Section: Modal Reduction To Essencementioning

confidence: 99%

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Knowing how things might have been

Jago

2018

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I know that I could have been where you are right now and that you could have been where I am right now, but that neither of us could have been turnips or natural numbers. This knowledge of metaphysical modality stands in need of explanation. I will offer an account based on our knowledge of the natures, or essencess, of things. I will argue that essences need not be viewed as metaphysically bizarre entities; that we can conceptualise and refer to essences; and that we can gain knowledge of them. We can know about which properties are, and which properties are not, essential to a given entity. This knowledge of essence offers a route to knowledge of the ways those entities must be or could be.

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“…10 For the discussion of this view see: VanCleve (1985),Simons (1994) Paul (2010). andBarker and Jago (2018).…”

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confidence: 99%

Strong Pluralism, Coincident Objects and Haecceitism

Lenart

Szachniewicz

2019

Axiomathes

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According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide. The most common objection towards such view invokes the so-called Grounding Problem according to which the strong pluralist needs to explain what the grounds are for supposed modal differences between the coincidents. As recognized in the literature, the failure to provide an answer to the Grounding Problem critically undermines the plausibility of strong pluralism. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that strong pluralists cannot provide an explanation of the Grounding Problem. In this paper, we argue that strong pluralism can be motivated independently of the successful answer to the Grounding Problem. In order to achieve that aim, we provide a haecceitistic interpretation of strong pluralism according to which strong pluralism should be read as a position committed to the existence of primitive individuals, i.e., the individuals that have their criteria of individuation independently of their qualitative profiles. That said, we do not aim at defending haecceitism. Instead, our aim is rather modest: we want to provide a new way for the strong pluralist to supplement his view to make it more watertight.

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Material objects and essential bundle theory

Cited by 21 publications

References 22 publications

A bundle theory of words

A bundle theory of words

Knowing how things might have been

Strong Pluralism, Coincident Objects and Haecceitism

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