2019
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-06043-5_3
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Brexit and the UK Parliament: Challenges and Opportunities

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
11
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
4
4

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 15 publications
(11 citation statements)
references
References 8 publications
0
11
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Not only were they likely to provide the strongest evidence of any Brexit effect, but such files characterised the 2017–2019 parliamentary session, lasting (unusually) 2 years in order to get the Brexit legislation through, in what came to be known as the ‘Brexit Parliament’ (cf. Lynch et al, 2019: 54). While the majority of parliamentary activity was focused on activities other than Brexit, it has been shown that, beyond Brexit legislation, the government dealt with specific areas of policy rather than broader reforms and major bills (Institute for Government, 2020).…”
Section: Executive–legislative Relations: the Constrained Dominance O...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Not only were they likely to provide the strongest evidence of any Brexit effect, but such files characterised the 2017–2019 parliamentary session, lasting (unusually) 2 years in order to get the Brexit legislation through, in what came to be known as the ‘Brexit Parliament’ (cf. Lynch et al, 2019: 54). While the majority of parliamentary activity was focused on activities other than Brexit, it has been shown that, beyond Brexit legislation, the government dealt with specific areas of policy rather than broader reforms and major bills (Institute for Government, 2020).…”
Section: Executive–legislative Relations: the Constrained Dominance O...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That gave the government a majority of four seats, but in reality it was 11 because Sinn Féin’s MPs do not take their seats in the Commons (Hayward, 2020). In 2017, almost 90% of MPs were Conservative or Labour, and while other parties had some influence, they tended to split along left–right and pro-/anti-Brexit lines (Bale, 2020; Lynch, 2020; Russell, 2021; Whitaker, 2020). Numerous MPs would subsequently switch parties, join new ones or become independents at a higher rate than usual, primarily related to Brexit but also reflecting Labour’s factional conflicts (Table 1).…”
Section: British Parties Factions and Brexit Preferencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That set the scene for a struggle between Leavers and Remainers in the UK parliament over what type of deal to seek from the EU. The hung parliament of 2017–2019 contained (1) a large minority of pro-Remain opposition MPs seeking a second referendum; (2) a smaller minority of mainly Conservative ‘hard’ Brexiteers; and (3) loyalist government MPs and pragmatic opposition MPs prepared to settle for a ‘soft’ Brexit, where the UK would leave the EU but retain strong ties (Bale, 2020; Lynch, 2020; Russell, 2021; Whitaker, 2020). Such settings are usually ripe for a middle-ground compromise, given the lack of support for more polarised options.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While May embarked on a negotiation process aimed at producing a withdrawal bill mutually acceptable to the UK and the EU (Walker 2019), an election in June 2017 meant to strengthen her hand instead resulted in a hung parliament. Anti-Brexit Conservative MPs leveraged the political situation, pressuring the government to allow a "meaningful vote" for Parliament on any negotiated deal (Lynch, Whitaker, and Cygan 2019). This resulted in considerable executive-legislative tensions regarding the ability to determine UK foreign policy, shifting ultimate authority for a Brexit deal from the comparatively fleet decisionmaking of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to the cadenced, contemplative, and rule-bound procedures of Parliament.…”
Section: Decision Proceduresmentioning
confidence: 99%