Brentano (and Some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner Consciousness

Textor, Mark

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01080.x

Cited by 65 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…According to Mark Textor (), talk about M and M* ‘belonging to,’ or ‘forming,’ a single mental state suggests a mereological relation: M and M* are two parts of a single mental state. We may call this the ‘fusion interpretation’: a conscious experience of a tree is a mereological fusion of an awareness‐of‐tree and an awareness‐of‐awareness‐of‐tree.…”

Section: Brentano's Theory Of Consciousness: An Interpretive Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Brentano often sounds similar, for example when speaking of the ‘peculiar fusion ( eigentümliche Verschmelzung ) of awareness and the object of awareness’ (1874: I, 196 [139]) that we find in inner awareness. On this basis, Textor (: 422) asserts that Hossack's identity thesis, while perhaps attractive, is simply not Brentano's view.…”

Section: Brentano's Theory Of Consciousness: An Interpretive Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Textor (: 423) relies on this passage to argue for the implausibility of the identity interpretation—as well he should, given the explicit denial of identity in the passage. I would suggest, however, that Brentano is trying, in such passages, to highlight the difference between a conscious state qua awareness of a tree and a conscious state qua awareness of awareness of a tree.…”

Section: The Mereology Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In expounding his identity interpretation, Hossack () appears to make no provision for the mereological subtleties of Brentano's account (although see Hossack for some distancing from the straight‐up identity interpretation). In defending the fusion interpretation, Textor () explicitly recognizes that M* is a divisive (i.e., a merely‐distinguishable part) of M. What he fails to recognize, however, is that this means there is only one mental state involved. Textor says that ‘A “divisive” is an object that can be distinguished in another object as a part, although it cannot be separated from it’ (Textor : 423).…”

Section: The Mereology Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness

Kriegel

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of . Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can be simultaneously thought of, or framed, equally accurately as (i) an awareness of a tree or (ii) an awareness of an awareness of a tree.(C*) (Intransitively) conscious states are states we are (transitively) conscious of.Given relatively straightforward links between the intransitive/transitive and active/passive distinctions, C3 and C* amount to the same.The transitivity principle is the starting point of many modern theories of consciousness, including so-called higher-order perception theories (Armstrong 1968, Lycan 1990), higher-order thought theories (Rosenthal 1990, 2005, Carruthers 2000, and self-representational theories (Kriegel 2003a, 2009, Van Gulick 2006. 4 All three accept the transitivity principle, but play it out in different ways (see Figure 1 overleaf).On the higher-order perception model, when S consciously perceives a tree, S is in two mental states simultaneously: M, which represents the tree, and M*, which represents M in a perception-like manner, as through shining a flashlight on M. On the higher-order thought model, S is in two states as well: M, which represents the tree, and M*, which represents M in a thought-like manner, as though mentally describing M. On the selfrepresentational model, S is in one state only, M, which performs double duty as 3 Speaking of a state of consciousness should not be taken to imply that consciousness is a thing whose state is being mentioned. Just as we speak of states of mind without implying that the mind is a thing in the sense that a chair is, so we can speak of consciousness without that implication. 4 It is also rejected, however, by several modern theories of consciousness, notably representationalism (see Dretske 1993).

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Section: Brentano's Theory Of Consciousness: An Interpretive Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Brentano's Theory Of Consciousness: An Interpretive Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Mereology Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Mereology Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness

Kriegel

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…O estudo brentaniano da experiência, entendida como experiência interna, revela a estrutura representacional dos fenômenos mentais. Na recente literatura neo-brentaniana, em particular, Brentano tem sido associado aos temas relacionados ao estudo da consciência: um fenômeno mental é um ato de representação ou auto-representação (Textor 2006).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

As concepções brentaniana e neo-brentaniana dos objetos das sensações: extensão e limite de uma visão representacionalista da mente

Araujo

2014

Principia

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Abstract. The paper proposes an analysis of the Bretanian conception of the objects of sensations and a review of the neo-Brentanian literature on this theme. Starting from the Brentanian thesis that all mental phenomena are intentional, it intends to analyze if the objects of sensations would have the same intentional property. This is also an issue on the meaning and the home of the objects of sensations. From the analysis of the Brentanian thesis, in parallel, the paper seeks to identify the extent and the limit of a representationalist perspective in Philosophy of Mind. Finally, it indicates a form of adverbialism as a possible alternative to a representationalist view on the objects of sensations.

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Brentano on Presenting Something as an Intentional Object

Fisette

2022

Logic, Argumentation &Amp; Reasoning

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Brentano's use of "something" (aliquid, etwas, quelque chose) takes on its full meaning in the context of his investigations regarding the nature of mental phenomena. This is confirmed in this excerpt from a 1908 manuscript on ontology:The entire theory of the proper meaning and the diverse improper meanings of "something" or of "thing" or of "what-is" is clarified only through the study of the psychical activities and of the expression that our thinking finds in language. All our psychical activities have objects and have as objects what a something in proper sense is. (Brentano, 2020, §63)

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Brentano (and Some Neo-Brentanians) on Inner Consciousness

Cited by 65 publications

References 27 publications

Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness

Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness

As concepções brentaniana e neo-brentaniana dos objetos das sensações: extensão e limite de uma visão representacionalista da mente

Brentano on Presenting Something as an Intentional Object

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