Brazilian Trade Unions

Abstract

Brazilian labour unions have an excellent reputation in international trade union circles, often being depicted as one of the most dynamic and militant labour movements today. In Brazil, however, many scholars criticize the unions for having abandoned the struggle taken up in the late 1970s against the industrial relations system and the limits it imposes on their actions. Since its creation in the 1930s, the authoritarian corporatist labour relations system has, in fact, proven to be extremely resilient. It survived two periods of intense political upheaval-the trade union movement having played a predominant role in both-and radical change to the country's economic model without undergoing major transformations. The adoption of a new Constitution in 1988 introduced only minor alterations, leaving the pillars of the corporatist system intact until today.In this article, we put to the test a widespread, determinist vision of Brazilian trade unionism, according to which unions maintain a paradoxical yet atavistic relationship with the heavy body of laws that provides them with advantages while limiting their freedom. In order to reflect on this, we performed field enquiries on two trade unions carefully chosen for their archetypical profile. Our research activities were conducted in the midst of the debate (from June 2005 to July 2006) on the ambitious project to reform the industrial relations system, initiated by former trade union leader and Karen Lang is an independent researcher in Sao Paulo, Brazil (ruthylang@hotmail.com).

Industrial Relations in Emerging Economies

“…Most fall somewhere in between. This characterization is supported by the findings of Lang and Gagnon (2009), who undertook case studies of two Brazilian unions with the goal of understanding the influence of the state corporatist structure and labour legislation (the CLT) on union practices, including their degree of autonomy. The authors study the Metalúrgicos do ABC (Metalworkers of São Paulo's ABC region), who are affiliated with the CUT and who were pioneers of the new unionism of the 1970s, as well as the Costureiras for the São Paulo and Osasco Region (Seamstresses), who are affiliated with Força Sindical.…”

“…The union tax has been criticized for providing incentives for the formation of unions -and emergence of union leaders -more interested in getting access to the funds than in genuinely representing the workers. Moreover, as the unions have guaranteed revenues, there is less incentive to affiliate and organize workers (Lang and Gagnon, 2009;Zylberstajn, 2006;Pichler, 2005).…”

“…As a result, routine disputes about workplace grievances are handled through individual legal action within the labour court system. The absence of in-company grievance procedures, coupled with laws that permit employers to fire workers without just cause, has meant that workers have tended to keep problems at work to themselves until they are fired, and then seek remedy in the labour courts (French, 2004;Lang and Gagnon, 2009). Moreover, with no provision for representing workers at the workplace and with disputes resolved by the labour courts, collective bargaining was often distant from the concerns of the union membership, further curtailing its development (Pichler, 2005).…”

“…Under the military dictatorship, the Government resumed its interventionist approach to industrial relations. Massive purges of the labour movement were conducted; union leaders were replaced by army officers and suspected communists were arrested (Lang and Gagnon, 2009). 4 Strikes in sectors deemed essential were prohibited, the minimum legal working age was reduced from 14 to 12 years, the scope for individual dismissal was increased, and the normative powers of the labour courts were reduced.…”

“…Nevertheless, the Constitution left the fundamental pillars of the industrial relations system intact, including the principle of unicidade sindical (whereby all workers in a particular occupational category and jurisdiction are automatically covered by the respective union), the union tax, as well as the Labour Courts. Leaving the union tax in place, but removing the Ministry's role in approving the formation of new unions, encouraged the creation of new unions, many of which were solely interested in accessing the funds of the union tax (Lang and Gagnon, 2009;Pichler, 2005;Zylberstajn, 2006).…”