Brand Congruence in Interpersonal Relations: A Social Network Analysis

Reingen, Peter H.; Foster, Brian L.; Brown, Jacqueline Johnson; Seidman, Stephen B.

doi:10.1086/209013

Cited by 152 publications

(91 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…There exists no inventory of the types of social networks that connect consumers in different markets, and how these different types of connections affect the diffusion process or market dynamics. Only one empirical study has been found that investigated the relation between social networks and brand choice [13]. Using graph-theoretic social network techniques, they found that people in more cohesive groups, indicating stronger links between the people, more frequently buy the same brands of products, thus suggesting that a closer social network stimulates homogeneity in consumption.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulating Market Dynamics: Interactions between Consumer Psychology and Social Networks

Janssen

Jager

2003

Artificial Life

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Markets can show different types of dynamics, from quiet markets dominated by one or a few products, to markets with continual penetration of new and reintroduced products. In a previous article we explored the dynamics of markets from a psychological perspective using a multi-agent simulation model. The main results indicated that the behavioral rules dominating the artificial consumer's decision making determine the resulting market dynamics, such as fashions, lock-in, and unstable renewal. Results also show the importance of psychological variables like social networks, preferences, and the need for identity to explain the dynamics of markets. In this article we extend this work in two directions. First, we will focus on a more systematic investigation of the effects of different network structures. The previous article was based on Watts and Strogatz's approach, which describes the small-world and clustering characteristics in networks. More recent research demonstrated that many large networks display a scale-free power-law distribution for node connectivity. In terms of market dynamics this may imply that a small proportion of consumers may have an exceptional influence on the consumptive behavior of others (hubs, or early adapters). We show that market dynamics is a self-organized property depending on the interaction between the agents' decision-making process (heuristics), the product characteristics (degree of satisfaction of unit of consumption, visibility), and the structure of interactions between agents (size of network and hubs in a social network).

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulating Market Dynamics: Interactions between Consumer Psychology and Social Networks

Janssen

Jager

2003

Artificial Life

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“…On the other hand, others attempt to establish the casual effects of social interactions on adoption decisions at the individual level (Nair, Manchanda and Bhatia 2010;Nam, Manchanda, and Chintagunta 2010;Zhang 2010). A few researchers examine social interactions in a multiattribute utility framework 1 (Narayan, Rao, and Saunders 2011;Yang and Allenby 2003) or explicitly collect network information (Nair, Manchanda, and Bhatia 2010;Narayan, Rao, and Saunders 2011;Reingen et al 1984). In studying choice interdependence, we conceptualize individual choices to be driven by multi-attribute utilities and focus on the passive form of social interactions.…”

Section: Literature Review and Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling Choice Interdependence in a Social Network

Wang¹,

Aribarg

Atchadé

2013

Marketing Science

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This paper investigates how individuals' product choices are influenced by the product choices of their connected others and how the influence mechanism may differ for fashion- versus technology-related products. We conduct a novel field experiment to induce and observe choice interdependence in a closed social network. In our experiment, we conceptualize individuals' choices to be driven by multiattribute utilities, and we measure their initial attribute preferences prior to observing their choice interdependence and collecting network information. These design elements help alleviate concerns in identifying social interaction effects from other confounds. Given that we have complete information on choices and their sequence, we use a discrete-time Markov chain model. Nonetheless, we also use a Markov random field (MRF) model as an alternative when the information on choice sequence is missing. We find significant social interaction effects. Our findings show that whereas experts exert asymmetrically greater influence on a technology-related product, popular individuals exert greater influence on a fashion-related product. In addition, we find choices made by early decision makers to be more influential than choices made later for the technology-related product. Finally, using the MRF with snapshot data can also provide good out-of-sample predictions for a technology-related product.

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“…The approach used in this section is similar to the one used in [4] but the results that we find and their interpretations are different which will be discussed later in this section. In order to find the Nash equilibrium, we first need to find the best responses of agents in (2). To find the best response of each agent, we take the derivative of her utility function in (2) with respect to her consumption level and set it to zero.…”

Section: Second Stage Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Duopoly pricing game in networks with local coordination effects

Fazeli

Jadbabaie

2012

2012 IEEE 51st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

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In this paper, we study a duopoly pricing problem in which two firms compete for selling two products in a network. Our proposed model consists of two stages. In the first stage, firms set the price they charge agents for their product and the quality of the product they offer. For agents, the quality of the product can be interpreted as the payoff of a local coordination game played among them in the network. In the second stage, agents in the network decide what fraction of these two products to purchase. We first characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game played among agents in the network. We show that agents' actions in the Nash equilibrium consist of two terms, one of which is proportional to the agents' centrality in the network. Conditioned on agents playing the equilibrium policy, we find the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game played between firms. We show that even when firms are similar and offer a uniform price for agents, their Nash equilibrium price depends on the network structure.We then analyze sensitivity of the agents' consumption with respect to the price and quality of the product. We finally show that depending on a firm's opponent's price and quality, the optimal price of a firm can be higher, equal or less than the monopoly optimal price. © 2012 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.This conference paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/ese_papers/619 Duopoly Pricing Game in Networks With Local Coordination EffectsArastoo Fazeli † Ali Jadbabaie † Abstract-In this paper, we study a duopoly pricing problem in which two firms compete for selling two products in a network. Our proposed model consists of two stages. In the first stage, firms set the price they charge agents for their product and the quality of the product they offer. For agents, the quality of the product can be interpreted as the payoff of a local coordination game played among them in the network. In the second stage, agents in the network decide what fraction of these two products to purchase. We first characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game played among agents in the network. We show that agents' actions in the Nash equilibrium consist of two terms, one of which is proportional to the agents' centrality in the network. Conditioned on agents playing the equilibrium policy, we find the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game played between firms. We show that even when firms are similar and offer a uniform price for agents, their Nash equilibrium price depends on the network structure. We then analyze sensitivity of the agents' consumption with respect to the price and quality of the product. We finally show that depending on a firm's opponent's pri...

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Brand Congruence in Interpersonal Relations: A Social Network Analysis

Cited by 152 publications

References 31 publications

Simulating Market Dynamics: Interactions between Consumer Psychology and Social Networks

Simulating Market Dynamics: Interactions between Consumer Psychology and Social Networks

Modeling Choice Interdependence in a Social Network

Duopoly pricing game in networks with local coordination effects

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