Neuroethics 2004
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198567219.003.0004
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Brains, lies, and psychological explanations

Abstract: This chapter addresses the following question: If we adopt the view that it is the brain that feels, thinks, and decides, then how do we accommodate commonsense explanations of human behavior and the notion that we are intentional rational agents capable of voluntary action? It argues that there are limits to the coexistence of folk psychology (and the notion that we are intentional rational agents) and neuroscience. It explores how neuroethics must accommodate both science and ethics and, drawing on contempor… Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Por ejemplo, la filosofía naturalizada mediante la neurociencia y las presuntas evidencias empíricas de los hallazgos neurobiológicos no son base suficiente para ciertas distinciones conceptuales, como el de tener o no control de las propias acciones (un cierto equivalente funcional de la libertad), y, desde luego, no son fundamento de nociones normativas (Buller, 2008;Churchland, 2008). Asimismo, con mucha razón, Bennett y Hacker critican el reduccionismo neurocientífico, porque comete una "falacia mereológica" (Bennett y Hacker, 2003), al atribuir propiedades a las partes que deberían atribuirse al todo.…”
Section: Un Nuevo Horizonte Filosófico Marcado Por La Neurofilosofíaunclassified
“…Por ejemplo, la filosofía naturalizada mediante la neurociencia y las presuntas evidencias empíricas de los hallazgos neurobiológicos no son base suficiente para ciertas distinciones conceptuales, como el de tener o no control de las propias acciones (un cierto equivalente funcional de la libertad), y, desde luego, no son fundamento de nociones normativas (Buller, 2008;Churchland, 2008). Asimismo, con mucha razón, Bennett y Hacker critican el reduccionismo neurocientífico, porque comete una "falacia mereológica" (Bennett y Hacker, 2003), al atribuir propiedades a las partes que deberían atribuirse al todo.…”
Section: Un Nuevo Horizonte Filosófico Marcado Por La Neurofilosofíaunclassified
“…There has been discussion in the literature regarding whether neuroimaging might be able to capture legal constructs like intentionality, reason, responsibility or truthfulness instead of the less helpful (from a legal point of view) neurobiological and psychological constructs like impulsivity or impaired goal-setting [75][76][77][78][79][80][81][82]. And indeed some progress has been made on using neuroimaging to determine whether one is lying, or whether a memory is genuine, as well as to ascertain personality traits, interpersonal skills, and some underlying emotions and desires [83,84] But in many respects, this is the wrong perspective to be taking.…”
Section: Conclusion: Connecting the Brain To The Mindmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, neuroscientists can explain the neural processes of behavior, but not the presence of intentionality during a criminal act (Greene & Cohen, ). Neuroimaging cannot uncover human reason (Buller, ; Gazzaniga & Steven, ) or personal responsibility (Gazzaniga, ) as such concepts are not anatomically localizable.…”
Section: Legal Contextsmentioning
confidence: 99%