Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information

Saran, René

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.002

Cited by 16 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…The mechanism design literature has a growing body of works that impose deviations from rationality (e.g. no preference maximization (de Clippel, 2014), varying but bounded "depths of rationality" (Saran, 2016)). These may provide a starting point for future theoretical work on committee design.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study

Quement

Marcin

2020

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous preferences and test whether social preferences or cognitive constraints drive the (non-)existence of strategic communication. As prior communication may affect voting decisions, we separately and jointly test communication and voting choices and how they depend on the presence of heterogeneous preferences. Results are only consistent with a model of cognitive heterogeneity. Roughly 80% of subjects truth-tell and use a decision heuristic (i.e. vote with the majority of announced signals). The remaining sophisticated agents lie strategically and approximately apply their optimal decision rule.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study

Quement

Marcin

2020

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…The tentative acceptance rule is not doubly implementable. 20 Let (N, X, R, c, ≿) be such that N = {1, 2}, X = {a, b}, for each i ∈ N , R i = {R i , R ′ i }, and R = × i∈N R i . Preferences and (c, ≿) are defined as follows: for each i ∈ N ,…”

Section: Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values

Hagiwara

2022

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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We consider the implementation problem for incomplete information and private values. We investigate double implementability of social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria. We define a new strategic axiom that implies “strategy-proofness” and that is implied by “secure strategy-proofness,” but the converse of these relationships does not hold. We call it “weak secure-strategy-proofness.” We show that a social choice function is doubly implementable if and only if it is weakly securely-strategy-proof.

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“…Our work is also related to papers that consider the implementation of social choice functions when agents perform a limited number of rounds of elimination of dominated strategies. Saran's [23] implementation notion includes the requirement that any strategy combination that survives one round of elimination of strictly undominated strategies yields the outcome prescribed by the social choice function. He obtains for many economic environments that a strict subset of the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions can be implemented.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategically Simple Mechanisms

Börgers

Li²

2019

ECTA

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We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call “strategic simplicity,” and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first‐order beliefs about the other agents' preferences and first‐order certainty about the other agents' rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher‐order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy mechanisms are strategically simple. But many more mechanisms are strategically simple. In particular, strategically simple mechanisms may be more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem and the voting problem.

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Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information

Cited by 16 publications

References 40 publications

Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study

Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study

Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values

Strategically Simple Mechanisms

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