2022
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0115
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Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values

Abstract: We consider the implementation problem for incomplete information and private values. We investigate double implementability of social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria. We define a new strategic axiom that implies “strategy-proofness” and that is implied by “secure strategy-proofness,” but the converse of these relationships does not hold. We call it “weak secure-strategy-proofness.” We show that a social choice function is doubly implementable if and only if it is weakly… Show more

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