1991
DOI: 10.1016/0749-5978(91)90027-q
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Boundary effects of vague risk information on taxpayer decisions

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Cited by 42 publications
(36 citation statements)
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“…This notion of ambiguity in risk perceptions has a natural extension to criminal decision-making where detection probabilities are rarely known to potential offenders and are thus mostly subjective. While this concept has been broached before with respect to crime (Casey & Scholz, 1991a, 1991bNagin, 1998;Sherman, 1990), ambiguity in certainty perceptions is still an important but understudied topic that is fertile for new inquiries of perceptual deterrence.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This notion of ambiguity in risk perceptions has a natural extension to criminal decision-making where detection probabilities are rarely known to potential offenders and are thus mostly subjective. While this concept has been broached before with respect to crime (Casey & Scholz, 1991a, 1991bNagin, 1998;Sherman, 1990), ambiguity in certainty perceptions is still an important but understudied topic that is fertile for new inquiries of perceptual deterrence.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some recent experimental studies in psychology advocate the term "imprecision" or "vagueness" instead of ambiguity (e.g., Budescu, Weinberg, & Wallsten, 1988;Du & Budescu, 2005;Gonzalez-Vallejo, Bonazzi, & Shapiro, 1996;Kuhn & Budescu, 1996). According to this perspective, the imprecise information can be either with respect to the underlying probabilities or the range of possible outcomes (Budescu et al, 2002;Casey & Scholz, 1991;Du & Budescu, 2005;Gonzalez-Vallejo et al, 1996;Ho, Keller, & Keltyka, 2002;Kuhn & Budescu, 1996;Kunreuther, Meszaros, Hogarth, & Spranca, 1995;Schoemaker, 1989). To illustrate the difference between imprecise probabilities versus imprecise outcomes, consider an entrance into a sweepstakes drawing versus a purchase of a 6/49 state lottery ticket.…”
Section: Ambiguity Aversionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Previous research regarding unlikely events has not extended much further than events with likelihoods of approximately 5% or 10%. Such studies either have found that events were overweighted (Chipman, ; Kahn and Sarin, ; Curley and Yates, ; Casey and Scholz, ) or have not rejected ambiguity neutrality (Curley and Yates, ; Sarin and Weber, ). Two studies used stimuli more similar to ours but did not address the three challenges identified in the introduction to this article (incentives, isolation of ambiguity attitudes, and control for beliefs).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%