Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 Years after Dayton: Complexity Born of Paradoxes

Abstract

This paper will start with an analysis of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and assess to what extent it focused on peace-building, state-reconstruction and democratization. It will provide an overview of major peace-building, state-reconstruction and democratization initiatives by international and local actors in post-war Bosnia. Following the often-presented argument that "Dayton is a good peace agreement but a bad blueprint for a democratic state," the paper will ask if the Dayton Peace Agreement has failed in the consolidation of Bosnian statehood and the democratization of the country. In order to do this, an in-depth analysis of the current situation in terms of state consolidation and democratization will be given. The main argument of the paper demonstrates that while the Dayton Agreement had some inherent weaknesses, actions by local elites and international state-builders also explain some of the current issues of the Bosnian state.

Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Towards Transitional Justice

“…The agreement was seen from the very beginning as “both a blessing and a curse” (Weller & Wolff, 2006, p. 1). The violent nature of the war and its devastating human cost have prompted peace negotiators at the time to emphasize the military aspects of the conflict aiming to end violence (Keil & Kudlenko, , p. 4). Yet Bosnia and Herzegovina has also made great advances in the process of its postconflict transformation with its infrastructure rebuilt and half of its displaced persons supported in their return efforts to their original homes (Bieber, , p. 43).…”

Latent class analysis of ‘good citizenship’ forms among youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina

“…The main aim of the 'Dayton Peace Agreement', was to provide a peace-building, state-building and democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although many elements of the peace-building section that the 'Dayton Peace Agreement' provided have been successfully implemented, the results are less impressive in the areas of state-building and democratization (Keil & Kudlenko, 2015;Majstorovi c et al, 2015). The road towards democratization had been laid down in Article I.2 of the Constitution, articulating that 'Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections.…”

“…Annex III (Elections) and VI (Human Rights) of the 'Dayton Peace Agreement' also implies the focus on democratic elections as well as fundamental rights and freedoms. Although the 'Dayton Peace Agreement' was envisaged an embedded democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is not straightforward what type of democracy it should be (Keil & Kudlenko, 2015;). Also, local obstacles, the absence of a coherent strategy by international state-builders and the paradoxes deep-rooted in the 'Dayton Peace Agreement' (e.g., power-sharing mechanisms between and among different levels and jurisdictions of government) have led to a lack of progress and resulted in the stagnation of democratization.…”

Shared interests foster interethnic cooperation among politicians

“…Although officials recognize the benefits and incentives (electoral and otherwise) to cooperate with peers from other municipalities (World Bank 2009), they still often fail to do so (Jokay 2001, 99; Avramovic 2017). At least part of this failure is due to the “environment of pervasive mistrust among groups” (Avramovic 2017; see also Keil and Kudlenko 2015). Our study is designed to directly address these real-world cooperative dilemmas by building trust.…”

“…However, many studies continue to argue that to avoid ethnic tensions in divided societies, we should incentivize cooperation among elites (Rothchild 1997; Lijphart 2012). Referring to Bosnia, Keil and Kudlenko (2015) argue that ethnic tensions have not been fully resolved because of the lack of trust and willingness to cooperate among elites.…”