Transitional justice has emerged to address victims' needs as a means of restoring relations broken by violence. Yet we know little about victims' attitudes towards different transitional justice mechanisms. Why do some victims prioritize retributive justice while others favor other forms of dealing with the violent past? What determines victims' attitudes towards transitional justice policies? To address these questions, we offer a new theoretical framework that draws upon recent insights from the field of evolutionary psychology and links both war exposure and postwar environments to transitional justice preferences. We argue that both past experiences of wartime violence and present-day social interdependence with perpetrators impact transitional justice preferences, but in divergent ways (resulting in greater support for retributive vs. restorative justice measures, respectively). To test our framework, we rely upon a 2013 representative survey of 1,007 respondents focusing on general population attitudes towards transitional justice in Bosnia two decades after the implementation of the Dayton Accords. Specifically, we examine the impact of displacement, return to prewar homes, loss of property, loss of a loved one, physical injury, imprisonment, and torture on attitudes towards transitional justice. On the whole, our findings confirm our two main hypotheses: Exposure to direct violence and losses is associated with more support for retributive justice measures, while greater present-day interdependence with perpetrators is associated with more support for restorative justice measures. While acknowledging the legacy of wartime violence, we highlight the importance of the postwar context and institutional mechanisms that support victims in reconstructing their lives.KEY WORDS: exposure to violence, transitional justice, displacement, Bosnia, retributive justice, restorative justice, victimhoodThe war of 1992-95 left a deep trauma in Bosnian society as the country was subjected to an armed campaign characterized by ethnic cleansing and the genocide in Srebenica unprecedented for 345 0162-895X

The main purpose of this study was to explore the cause-and-effect relation of maximal muscle strength (MSmax) on the optimum drop height (DHopt) that maximizes power output in drop jump. In total, 30 physically active male students participated in this study, whereas the 16 subjects were selected according to their resistance strength training background (i.e., level of MSmax) and allocated into 2 equal subgroups: strong (n = 8) and weak (n = 8). The main testing session consisted of drop jumps performed from 8 different drop heights (i.e., from 0.12 to 0.82 m). The individual DHopt was determined based on the maximal value power output across applied ranges of drop heights. The tested relationships between DHopt and MSmax were moderate (r = 0.39-0.50, p ≤ 0.05). In addition, the stronger individuals, on average, showed maximal values of power output on the higher drop height compared with the weaker individuals (0.62 vs. 0.32 m). Finally, significant differences in the individual DHopt between groups were detected (p < 0.01). The present findings suggest that drop height should be adjusted based on a subject's neuromuscular capacity to produce MSmax. Hence, from the perspective of strength and conditioning practitioners, MSmax should be considered as an important factor that could affect the DHopt, and therefore should be used for its adjustment in terms of optimizing athlete's testing, training, or rehabilitation intervention.

This article focuses on post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina to investigate decisions of forced migrants to return home to their pre-conflict residences. We formulate a set of novel hypotheses on the demographic determinants of return as well as on the role of social capital, national ideology, integration, and war victimization. We use a 2013 Bosnian representative sample with 1,007 respondents to test our hypotheses. The findings support the expectation that gender and age have a major impact on return. Net of other factors, women and those experiencing wartime victimization are less likely to return. Older Bosnians with positive memories of pre-conflict interethnic relations are more likely to return than younger persons or those with negative memories. The probability of return for example for a 30-year-old woman with a permanent job is 11.54%, while for a 63-year-old man without a permanent job is 93.92%. Moreover, ethnic Bosniacs are more likely to return than ethnic Croats or ethnic Serbs while less nationalistic IDPs are more likely to return. We discuss the implications of our findings for post-war returns in Bosnia and for the comparative study of durable solutions to displacement particularly effort to support return in postconflict societies.

This article examines how the right of return is negotiated and implemented in post-conflict societies. It focuses on cases of voluntary yet difficult returns and identifies the conditions under which victims of ethnic cleansing choose to return despite opposition from new occupants and hostile local authorities. The article provides a theoretical framework for the study of return and examines the importance of security provisions, material incentives, contact, and ideology. Drawing on the experiences of Bosnian (Drvar) and Cypriot (Maronite) returnees, it emphasizes the role of social capital as manifested through refugee organizations and demonstrates how community effort resolves coordination and commitment problems, thereby facilitating a voluntary peaceful return.

The rise of the modern national states in the post-Ottoman Balkans was accompanied by coercive assimilation, deportation, and even extermination of ethnic minorities, especially the local Muslims. In the formative periods of the Serbian state and Royal Yugoslavia, ethnic Albanians were repeatedly subjected to most exclusionary and discriminatory policies. While these actions of the Serbian élite were guided by the geopolitical security pressures and the coercive utopia of homogeneous nation-state, Serbian policy makers were also influenced by a strong intellectual tradition of intolerance towards Muslim Albanians. While some members of the Serbian élite were planning and implementing repression and expulsion of Albanians, others were calling for tolerance and inclusion of Albanians in a wider Balkan union. The analysis of Serbian policies towards Albanians in the Balkan context enables us to reformulate and extend Miroslav Hroch’s influential theory of minority nationalisms.