Bootleggers and Baptists in the Theory of Regulation

Yandle, Bruce

doi:10.4337/9780857936110.00012

Cited by 76 publications

(93 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…In spite of recent suggestions to increase regulation, the absence of excessive credit market regulation is the strongest predictor for a positive SWB within the Regulation component. This is in line with views that examine regulatory capture (Boehm 2007), which for the most part regard regulation as a protection of particular interest groups (Yandle 1983, Stigler 1971, Downs 1957 or emphasize its adverse effects (Peltzman 2010). However, a high EF value is not always related to a higher SWB.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 82%

Who Benefits from Economic Freedom? Unraveling the Effect of Economic Freedom on Subjective Well-Being

Gehring

2013

World Development

105

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Abstract:Does economic freedom increase the utility of an average citizen? Public choice theory in particular has emphasized the shortcomings of governments and voting processes, and the advantages of relying on markets and individual decision making. However, an increasing amount of people are refusing to accept classical measures like GDP as signs of improvements in welfare. Data on subjective well-being allow economists to test if economic freedom really does improve the overall quality of life. However, existing studies have either failed to control for necessary control variables or lacked theoretical foundation. This paper explains economic and psychological reasons why the influence of economic freedom reaches beyond material well-being.Empirical results from a panel of 86 countries over the 1990-2005 period suggest that economic freedom indeed has a positive effect on happiness. Specifically legal security and property rights, access to sound money, and freedom from excessive regulation are significantly positive throughout the analysis. Regarding freedom to trade, the results show that particularly regulatory trade barriers have a significant negative effect. The positive effect depends on socio-demographic characteristics and is, on average, stronger for poorer countries and left-wing voters, and varies with age.JEL Codes: A13, D60, H11

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 82%

Who Benefits from Economic Freedom? Unraveling the Effect of Economic Freedom on Subjective Well-Being

Gehring

2013

World Development

105

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“…The empirical literature is relatively mute on this question. Nonetheless, most theories of regulation assume that the electorate plays at least some role in pressuring politicians to adopt regulations that conform to their preferences (see, for example, Stigler, 1971;Yandle, 1983;Becker, 1983). Our reasoning is that politicians have only a limited menu of policy instruments with which to convince voters that they are acting in their interests.…”

Section: Partisan Regulatory Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pick Your Poison: Do Politicians Regulate When They Can’t Spend?

Johnson,

Mitchell,

Yamarik

2012

SSRN Journal

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We investigate whether laws restricting fiscal policies across U.S. states lead politicians to adopt more partisan regulatory policy instead. We first show that partisan policy outcomes do exist across U.S. states, with Republicans cutting taxes and spending and Democrats raising them. We then demonstrate that these partisan policy outcomes are moderated in states with no-carry restrictions on public deficits. Lastly, we test whether unified Republican or Democratic state governments regulate more when constrained by no-carry restrictions. We find no-carry laws restrict partisan fiscal outcomes but tend to lead to more partisan regulatory outcomes.

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“…Esse diagnóstico decorre da celebrada teoria apresentada nos anos 1980 por Yandle (1983Yandle ( e 1989, mais conhecida como a teoria dos batistas e contrabandistas... Tal denominação curiosa decorre da ambientação que Yandle propõe para sua teoria: a regulação do mercado de bebidas alcoólicas que impede que os pontos-de-venda funcionem aos domingos. Em defesa da temperança, os batistas atuam no interesse geral; por seu turno, prevendo obter ganhos especiais decorrentes da restrição à competição nesse mercado, os contrabandistas acionam o mecanismo do rent seeking (Monteiro, 2004, capítulo 1).…”

Section: Rap Rio Deunclassified

Estratégias institucionais em ano eleitoral

Monteiro

2006

Rev. Adm. Pública

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Bootleggers and Baptists in the Theory of Regulation

Cited by 76 publications

References 10 publications

Who Benefits from Economic Freedom? Unraveling the Effect of Economic Freedom on Subjective Well-Being

Who Benefits from Economic Freedom? Unraveling the Effect of Economic Freedom on Subjective Well-Being

Pick Your Poison: Do Politicians Regulate When They Can’t Spend?

Estratégias institucionais em ano eleitoral

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