Boko-Haram and the Global Jihad: ‘Do Not Think Jihad is Over. Rather Jihad Has Just Begun’

The geopolitics of Boko Haram and Nigeria's ‘war on terror’

“…Nigerians frequently talk of six regions in the country – north‐east, north‐central, north‐west, south‐east, south‐west and south‐south. The conflict between Islam and Western power dates back to the nineteenth century with the British colonial administration and the Sokoto Caliphate (Agbiboa ; see Last ; Falola ). However the Sokoto Caliphate, geographically linked to modern north‐western Nigeria, was a rival to the Kanem‐Bornu empire in the north‐east (Elkaim ), which indicates the problems of a simple north–south, Muslim–Christian divide.…”

“…Adesoji suggests, though, without much evidence, that Boko Haram is getting support from global jihadist groups and specifically claims ‘affinity with the North Africa branch of Al‐Qaeda’ (2011, 105). The US regional command AFRICOM commander, General Carter Ham, alleged in August 2011 that there are links, at least in aspiration AQIM and al‐Shabaab, based in Somalia (Aghedo and Osumah , 864; Johnson ; Higazi ; Agbiboa ). The connections with the latter are on the basis of a similarity of methods – suicide bombings and video recordings (Cook , 22–3), but these have been used by diverse groups for different purposes.…”

Operational Dynamics of Boko Haram's Terrorist Campaign Following Leadership Succession

“…Instead, the group has demonstrated the ability to exploit preexisting ethnic, political, and religious cleavages in Nigeria, and has recruited enough new members who share Boko Haram's jihadist worldview (Hill, ). Its viability as a terrorist organization also is facilitated by economic disparities between primarily Muslim northern and primarily non‐Muslim southern Nigeria that are congruent with those cleavages combined with a central government plagued by corruption and the inability to provide sufficient security (Bamidele, Olaniyan, and Ayodele, ; Agbiboa, ; Adedokun, ). Those external factors—especially government corruption, lack of the rule of law, and a failure to provide security—make it difficult for counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency campaigns to achieve a desired end state (Kilcullen, ; Keeley, ; Migdal, ).…”

Insurgency and Nigeria’s Relations with Her Immediate Neighbors in the Twenty-first Century

“…Around the time, under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, the group focused on the grooming and proselytization of people for more radical adventure while considering the ordinary Muslims as aberrant and government as corrupt. Members were drawn from mostly uneducated and unemployed Nigerian youths, as well as illegal immigrants from the neighboring states of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon (Agbiboa 2014; Osumah 2013). The arrest and extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 (Agbiboa 2014) and the emergence of Abubakar Shekau as the new leader marked the mutation of the Boko Haram from being a sect organization to a terrorist group.…”

“…Members were drawn from mostly uneducated and unemployed Nigerian youths, as well as illegal immigrants from the neighboring states of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon (Agbiboa 2014; Osumah 2013). The arrest and extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 (Agbiboa 2014) and the emergence of Abubakar Shekau as the new leader marked the mutation of the Boko Haram from being a sect organization to a terrorist group. From then on, they made the entire Northeastern Nigeria almost desolate and inhabitable for both citizens and foreigners.…”