Boards of directors: A review and research agenda

Johnson, Jonathan L.; Daily, Catherine M.; Ellstrand, Alan E.

doi:10.1016/s0149-2063(96)90031-8

Cited by 589 publications

(826 citation statements)

References 121 publications

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“…In fact, when analyzing the history of corporate governance, it is noticed that the Board of Directors, as well as its independence from the beginning, was highlighted as the main internal mechanism to reduce agency costs between shareholders and managers and, as a consequence, to improve company performance. Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) cite three functions of the Board of Directors: control, consultancy, and identification of resources. Regarding control, the Board acts as an internal body of the company responsible for monitoring directors, and it represents, within the company, owners' aspirations.…”

Section: Corporate Governance Agency Problem and Player Remunerationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance Characteristics as a Stimulus to Tax Management

Gomes

2016

Rev. contab. finanç.

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This article aimed to investigate whether corporate governance uses tax management to increase companies' performance. The objective was checking whether corporate governance characteristics, such as remuneration paid to the executive board, segregation between Chairman and CEO, and the independence and composition of the Board of Directors, influence tax management in Brazilian companies. At the same time, it aimed to identify whether the preceding tax management is reflected on the subsequent tax management. To do this, a sample of 355 Brazilian companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA between 2008 and 2014 was used, in order to find out whether their corporate governance characteristics influenced tax management, something identified by calculating ETR, CashETR, and BTD. As a result, it was found (i) that the remuneration paid to executives may be regarded as a characteristic influencing tax management in Brazilian firms, and (ii) that the preceding tax management influences the future tax management. In addition, it was found that Brazilian companies do not rule out tax management benefits, since the average effective rate in the sample under analysis was 25%, and it is statistically lower than the nominal rate of taxes on earnings in Brazil, which is 34%.

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Section: Corporate Governance Agency Problem and Player Remunerationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance Characteristics as a Stimulus to Tax Management

Gomes

2016

Rev. contab. finanç.

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“…D'ailleurs, si l'améliora-tion de la qualité de gouvernance pourrait aider le dirigeant à gérer l'entreprise de façon plus efficace, les investisseurs, par exemple, n'ont ni les mêmes priorités 18 ni les mêmes objectifs 19 (Khanchel, 2007 a;Wirtz, 2005) Par ailleurs, plusieurs arguments avancés dans la litté-rature expliquent que la bonne gouvernance pourrait ne pas être une priorité pour les entreprises. Le premier argument, soutenu par certaines études (Johnson, Daily et Ellstrand, 1996;Wirtz, 2005), indique que les bonnes pratiques de gouvernance ne sont pas des facteurs pertinents. En effet, « la bonne gouvernance est beaucoup plus un élément de distinction qu'un facteur de différenciation » (Heracleous, 2001, p.168).…”

Section: Tableauunclassified

Les questions de gouvernance dans les entreprises socialement responsables

Khanchel

2013

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Cet article se propose d’étudier si les caractéristiques de gouvernance des entreprises socialement responsables diffèrent de celles des autres entreprises. A partir d’un échantillon d’entreprises socialement responsables (classées dans Business Ethics magasine) et d’un échantillon témoin pour la période 2006-2009, nous avons cherché à savoir si la responsabilité sociale était un levier déterminant qui contribuerait à l’amélioration de la qualité de gouvernance. Sur les échantillons concernés, la démonstration n’a pu être faite d’un lien entre la responsabilité sociale et la gouvernance.This study examines whether socially responsible firms behave differently from other firms in their corporate governance. Specifically, we question whether firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility (CSR) also behave in a responsible manner to enhance corporate governance practices. Using Business Ethics lists for 2006 to 2009, we have constructed a sample with 350 U.S. companies receiving an ethics rating and 350 other firms (considered as matching firms and not considered as socially responsible firms in any CSR ratings). Our results show no differences in corporate governance characteristics between the two samples of firms.El objetivo de este trabajo es establecer si las características de gobernanza de las empresas socialmente responsables difieren de las de otras empresas. Basados en una muestra de empresas socialmente responsables (clasificación Business Ethics) y en una muestra testigo por el período 2006-2009, hemos intentado establecer si la responsabilidad social es un factor deter- minante que contribuye al mejoramiento de la calidad de la gobernanza. Sobre la base de dichas muestras, no se pudo demostrar que existe un nexo entre responsabilidad social y gobernanza

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“…In corporate governance research, most of the attention is given to the board composition and its impact on firm performance. The most common measures of board composition are the number of directors, the insider/outsider ratio of the board and CEO duality (Zahra & Pearce, 1989;Johnson et al, 1996;Dalton et al, 1998Dalton et al, , 1999. These research are based on the premise that boards of directors in general, and the compositional characteristics of boards in particular, should influence organizational performance.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In some studies, it was found out that CEO duality have a positive effect on organizational performance (Daily and Dalton, 1994), whereas some other studies indicate negative effect (Rechner and Dalton, 1991;Coles, McWilliams, and Sen, 2001). Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) define inside directors as the directors who are also officers of the organization, and outside directors as all non-management members of the board. According to Forbes and Miliken (1999), insider board members may view the board work as an extension of their managerial responsibilities, but it is more likely that outside board members view the tasks of the board as being distinctly different and complementary to that of management and these members are not interested in the daily operations of the organization.…”

Section: Ceo Dualitymentioning

confidence: 99%