PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the determinants of good governance in the US firms.Design/methodology/approachThe data are taken from a sample of 624 US listed and non‐financial firms for the period of 1994‐2003. Four indices were constructed that summarize the governance quality: one indice for the board of directors, another one for the board committees, a third one for the audit committee, and a fourth representing an overall or total index. Multiple regressions analyses are used in the study to find the determinants of strong governance.FindingsThe empirical results show statistically significant and positive associations between each governance index (exception to board index) and firm size, investment opportunities, intangible assets and directors and officers ownership. Furthermore, institutional ownership and external financing needs are positively related to each governance index considered. However, growth opportunities and performance have no significant effect on governance quality.Research limitations/implicationsOther corporate governance mechanisms could be considered (transparency and disclosure, anti‐takeover provisions and shareholder's rights).Originality/valueThis paper adds evidence to the important debate about corporate governance ratings. It gives a most comprehensive analysis to date in term of sample size and breath coverage. This paper also offers a new contribution to the debate on the determinants of good governance by isolating the effects of firm characteristics on the board of directors from the effect on compensation and nominating committees and from the effect on audit committee.

The aim of this study is to determine the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on earnings management practices. Focusing on a sample of 2,031 firms listed in 15 European countries, the study uses three discretionary accrual metrics as a proxy for earnings management ( Dechow et al., 1995 ; Kothari et al., 2005 ; McNichols, 2002 ) models. To this end, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are applied to compare earnings management during the pre-pandemic period (2017q1–2019q4) and the pandemic period (2020q1–2020q4). The results indicate that the sample firms tend to manage earnings during the pandemic period than during the preceding period. This finding implies a reduced reliability of the financial reports during the COVID-19 pandemic. Further analysis provides evidence of significant income-increasing earnings management during 2020. This finding suggests that firms manage earnings upward by alleviating the level of reported losses to rebuild investor and stakeholder confidence needed to support the economic recovery.

This study examines whether chief executive officer (CEO) with narcissistic tendencies are more likely to disclose ESG activities. Focusing on a sample of 118 US S&P 500‐listed companies over the period 2011–2018, the study uses the generalized estimating equation. The results indicate that a CEO with high narcissism is more likely to disclose social and corporate governance activities. These findings clarify the relationship between CEO personality traits and ESG disclosure to help investors and stakeholders with decision‐making. Further in light of these findings, regulators are recommended to reinforce the legal framework of ESG disclosure pushing for more transparency with high levels of supervision.

No abstract

Recent high-profile corporate failures in the US and elsewhere in the world, many of which were caused by, or at least exacerbated by, weak governance practices, have convinced an increasing number of once sceptical investors that governance is a separate risk class that certainly requires attention and, in many cases, expert analysis. In this paper we examine corporate governance in Tunisia, North Africa, by analysing the board, the ownership structures and the financial market. By using a panel data set of 24 firms listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange for the period 2000 to 2005, we provide evidence that governance in Tunisian firms is characterised by strong blockholders (often including families). Moreover, firms can choose between a dual board and a monist board. Our estimates show that Tunisian governance is weak. Finally we provide evidence for a strong relationship between governance and corporate performance. Copyright (c) 2007 The Author; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.