Blockholder monitoring and the efficiency of pay-performance benchmarking

Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: Evidence from China's listed firms

“…They argued that the pay-performance relationship was positively related to blockholder intensity. A similar argument was echoed by Kim (2010), who suggested that the pay-performance relationship was positively determined by blockholder ownership. Several other studies examined whether the largest shareholder's ownership affects the pay-performance relationship.…”

Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone

“…As suggested in recent research, different types of blockholders are likely to differ from each other in their monitoring incentives, mainly due to difference in their investment horizons(Kim, 2010) and, as in our case, the interactions between multiple large shareholders and the nature of the controlling owner in the company.…”

“…In fact, family control is found in many geographical regions with varying legal and financial systems, including the United States, Western Europe, and East Asia (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a;Claessens et al, 2000;Dahya et al, 2008;Faccio and Lang, 2002;Kim, 2010;La Porta et al, 1999;Morck et al, 2005).…”

Do boards know when they hire a CEO that is a good match? Evidence from initial compensation

“…Goergen and Renneboog argue that rent-seeking CEOs may "capture the board (p. 1073)". Kim (2010) argues that CEOs earn rents because pay does not decline as much with negative luck as it increases with positive luck. Alternatively, if the board expects a CEO to be a better match, this in turn suggests that the board expects better firm performance, and therefore, the CEO is paid more initially.…”