Biological markets and the effects of partner choice on cooperation and friendship

Barclay, Pat

doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.012

Cited by 157 publications

(183 citation statements)

References 64 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

177

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Several enforcement mechanisms have been proposed: direct reciprocity [15,68,98], indirect reciprocity [70,77,78], punishment [30,32,33] and partner choice [35,75,76,84]. A growing number of experimental studies support the idea that, among this set of mechanisms, partner choice is likely to be particularly influential in nature, both in inter-specific and in intra-specific interactions [34,52,59,64,65,86,90].Besides, partner choice is also believed to play a major role in human cooperation, where friendships and coalitions are common [16,19,22] (see also Discussion).The key idea of partner choice models is that, when one happens to be paired with a defecting partner, one has the option to seek for another, more cooperative, partner present in the "biological market" and interact with her instead of the defector. This possibility allows PEER COMMUNITY IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY |…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why cooperation is not running away

Geoffroy

Baumard

André

2018

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why cooperation is not running away

Geoffroy

Baumard

André

2018

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Recent research indicates that expectations of fairness can arise from partner choice [3,24,26,75]. The intuition is that competition to be selected forces a rise in prosocial behaviour [6,35,55,68]. However, these results still do not explain why an individual would reject all unfair but profitable offers in a one-shot game.…”

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 45%

“…This idea has been discussed under the terms biological markets [6,55] and competitive altruism [35,68], and it has been empirically demonstrated that partner choice increases prosocial behaviour through competition [63,69,80]. However, whilst partner choice explains why trustees would offer a higher return, such work does not describe why an individual would reject all available profitable-but-unfair offers.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Expectations of Fairness and Trust Co-Evolve in Environments of Partial Information

Rauwolf¹,

Bryson²

2017

Dyn Games Appl

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When playing one-shot economic games, individuals often blindly trust others, accepting partnerships without any information regarding the trustworthiness of their partner. Consequently, they risk deleterious pacts. Oddly, when individuals do have information about another, they reject partnerships that are not fair, despite the fact that such offers are profitable-individuals costly punish. Why would one reject profitable partnerships on the one hand, but risk unknown offers on the other? Significant research has gone into explaining the contexts where blind trust or costly punishment provides an evolutionary advantage; however, both behaviours are rarely considered in tandem. Here we demonstrate that both behaviours can simultaneously be revenue maximizing. Further, given the plausible condition of partially obscured information and partner choice, trust mediates the generation of costly punishment. This result is important because it demonstrates that the evolutionary viability of trust, fairness, and costly punishment may be linked. The adaptive nature of fairness expectations can best be explained in concert with trust.

show abstract

“…In this paper we first show thatalthough both manipulation and preferential interactions are usually invoked to explain aversion to information gathering (20)(21)(22)(23)(24)-the current implementation of the envelope game only captures manipulation. Next, we extend the framework to heterogeneous populations to include preferential interactions.…”

Section: Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Preferential interactions promote blind cooperation and informed defection

Pérez‐Escudero

Friedman

Gore

2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is common sense that costs and benefits should be carefully weighed before deciding on a course of action. However, we often disapprove of people who do so, even when their actual decision benefits us. For example, we prefer people who directly agree to do us a favor over those who agree only after securing enough information to ensure that the favor will not be too costly. Why should we care about how people make their decisions, rather than just focus on the decisions themselves? Current models show that punishment of information gathering can be beneficial because it forces blind decisions, which under some circumstances enhances cooperation. Here we show that aversion to information gathering can be beneficial even in the absence of punishment, due to a different mechanism: preferential interactions with reliable partners. In a diverse population where different people have different-and unknown-preferences, those who seek additional information before agreeing to cooperate reveal that their preferences are close to the point where they would choose not to cooperate. Blind cooperators are therefore more likely to keep cooperating even if conditions change, and aversion to information gathering helps to interact preferentially with them. Conversely, blind defectors are more likely to keep defecting in the future, leading to a preference for informed defectors over blind ones. Both mechanisms-punishment to force blind decisions and preferential interactions-give qualitatively different predictions, which may enable experimental tests to disentangle them in realworld situations.cooperation | signaling | population heterogeneity | game theory | incomplete information W hy didn't you ask before? This question too often lacks a reasonable answer. Consider the case of Alice who, learning that her friend Bob was visiting her city, rushed to invite him to stay at her place-only to find, once the offer had been gratefully accepted, that Bob would occupy her living room for a whole month. Most people would agree: Alice should have asked before.However, Alice's behavior is not uncommon. We often refrain from gathering information about the costs and benefits of our interactions with others, and often with good reason: When the situation is reversed, we prefer people who directly agree to do us a favor over those who only agree after carefully weighing costs and benefits. Why do we have this preference? If someone agrees to do us a favor-or to cooperate with us in any other way-why should we care about how they made their decision?Intuitively, aversion to information gathering can be beneficial because it makes us prefer people who are more likely to cooperate. In addition, people who would in principle want to gather information may be inhibited by others' aversion to it. To illustrate these two mechanisms, let us first consider a simple scenario in which two types of people exist: unreliable and reliable. Unreliable types only cooperate in a limited set of conditions and need to gather additional information to deci...

show abstract

Biological markets and the effects of partner choice on cooperation and friendship

Cited by 157 publications

References 64 publications

Why cooperation is not running away

Why cooperation is not running away

Expectations of Fairness and Trust Co-Evolve in Environments of Partial Information

Preferential interactions promote blind cooperation and informed defection

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About