Biodiversity conservation incentive programs for privately owned forests

Mayer, Audrey L.; Tikka, Päivi M.

doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2006.07.004

Cited by 72 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Performance measures are implicitly included in the ''win-win'' principle because, without explicit benchmarks and monitoring, there is no guarantee that there will be a ''win'' for the regulator (Merenlender et al 2004;Saterson et al 2004;Mayer and Tikka 2006). In addition, the adaptability of the instrument mix is included in the ''instrument sequencing'' principle, which states that more interventionist instruments will be needed when the performance of the preferred less interventionist instrument is much lower than expected and insufficient to achieve the desired policy outcome.…”

Section: Critical Reflection Of Smart Regulation Criticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From “smart regulation” to “regulatory arrangements”

2010

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When regulators are faced with practical challenges, policy instrument choice theories can help them find the best solution. However, not all such theories are equally helpful. This paper aims to offer regulators a better alternative to the current policy instrument choice theories. We will specifically address the shortcomings of ''smart regulation theory'' and present an alternative that keeps the best of that theory while remediating its weak points. Some authors (Böcher and Töller 2003;Baldwin and Black 2008) say that smart regulation theory does not address institutional issues, compliance typespecific response, performance-sensitivity and adaptability of regulatory regime. We have resolved these problems by merging the smart regulation theory with the policy arrangement approach and the policy learning concept. We call the resulting approach ''regulatory arrangement approach'' (RAA). The central idea of the RAA is to constrain the almost infinite ''smart'' regulatory options by: the national policy style; adverse effects of policy arrangements of adjoining policies; the structure of the policy arrangement of the investigated policy and competence dependencies of other institutions. The reduction can be so drastic that the potential governance capacity falls below the smart regulation threshold. In other words, no smart regulatory arrangement can be developed in that institutional context unless policy learning occurs. In addition, a ''smart'' regulatory arrangement is no guarantee that the policy will succeed. For this reason, the performance of the regulatory arrangement is measured and evaluated. Performance below a certain threshold indicates that the regulatory arrangement needs to be adapted, which then results in policy learning. 123Policy Sci (2010) 43:245-261 DOI 10.1007 We illustrate the usefulness of this new approach with a secondary analysis of the Flemish sustainable forest management policy.

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Section: Critical Reflection Of Smart Regulation Criticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

From “smart regulation” to “regulatory arrangements”

2010

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“…Embora socialmente mais aceitos, preocupam quanto ao potencial de atingir metas de conservação compatíveis com as necessidades apontadas pelas ciências biológicas e da terra, uma vez que dependem da participação ativa dos proprietários e de recursos financeiros diversos e confiáveis, que dificilmente serão suficientes para manter sob regime de conservação todas as áreas que necessitam ser protegidas (DOREMUS, 2003). Revisões sobre estes programas voluntários revelam ainda que a falta de monitoramento adequado das agências governamentais e de metas de conservação explícitas, além da carência de base de dados, comprometem a eficiência ecológica destes mecanismos (MAYER, TIKKA, 2006). Já as medidas de caráter obrigatório encontram maior resistência dos proprietários de terras, uma vez que as limitações ao uso de recursos e os custos da proteção afetam diretamente seus interesses econômicos (CHOMITZ, 2004), mas também exigem das instituições competentes um eficiente sistema de controle para que surtam o efeito ecológico desejado (MAYER, TIKKA, 2006).…”

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“…Revisões sobre estes programas voluntários revelam ainda que a falta de monitoramento adequado das agências governamentais e de metas de conservação explícitas, além da carência de base de dados, comprometem a eficiência ecológica destes mecanismos (MAYER, TIKKA, 2006). Já as medidas de caráter obrigatório encontram maior resistência dos proprietários de terras, uma vez que as limitações ao uso de recursos e os custos da proteção afetam diretamente seus interesses econômicos (CHOMITZ, 2004), mas também exigem das instituições competentes um eficiente sistema de controle para que surtam o efeito ecológico desejado (MAYER, TIKKA, 2006). No Brasil, o Código Florestal (Lei federal 4.771 de 1965) estabelece que a responsabilidade da proteção da natureza é tarefa conjunta do Estado e da sociedade civil e institui instrumentos voltados para a proteção de atributos ambientais em todo o território nacional: as Áreas de Preservação Permanente (APPs) e as Reservas Legais (RLs).…”

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Determinantes da decisão de manter áreas protegidas em terras privadas: o caso das reservas legais do Estado de São Paulo

Marques

Ranieri

2012

Ambient. soc.

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Frente ao debate atual que cerca a legislação florestal brasileira, o presente artigo explora a correlação entre variáveis econômicas e a proporção de áreas protegidas instituídas em terras privadas, as reservas legais, nos municípios do estado de São Paulo. Sua principal contribuição é apontar que argumentos utilizados para justificar o descumprimento e embasar alterações às regras de proteção ambiental vigentes, não se sustentam.
Considering the contemporary debate on themes involving the Brazilian forest legislation, the present article explore correlations between economics factors and the variation in the proportion of protect areas on private ownerships, legal reserve, across the municipal districts of a Brazilian Stated, Sao Paulo. The main finding of the study is point that main argument used to explain the noncompliance to the law and change the valid environmental legislation, was not support

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“…The land use structure in the Natura 2000 areas lying on private land, for instance, are managed by their owners, chiefly farmers [52]. The issue of private land conservation has been explored through a diverse spectrum of mechanisms such as regulatory prohibitions and requirements including use of legal instruments, government acquisition of land or right over resource use leading to relocation and rehabilitation of previous residents (as observed during the establishment of the first national parks in the USA and still practiced in developing countries such as in Central Africa and South Asia), direct incentives for private conservation action [53][54][55][56] or educational programs and public consultations.…”

Section: Conflicts Over Conservation On Private Landsmentioning

confidence: 99%