From “smart regulation” to “regulatory arrangements”

Abstract

When regulators are faced with practical challenges, policy instrument choice theories can help them find the best solution. However, not all such theories are equally helpful. This paper aims to offer regulators a better alternative to the current policy instrument choice theories. We will specifically address the shortcomings of ''smart regulation theory'' and present an alternative that keeps the best of that theory while remediating its weak points. Some authors (Böcher and Töller 2003;Baldwin and Black 2008) say that smart regulation theory does not address institutional issues, compliance typespecific response, performance-sensitivity and adaptability of regulatory regime. We have resolved these problems by merging the smart regulation theory with the policy arrangement approach and the policy learning concept. We call the resulting approach ''regulatory arrangement approach'' (RAA). The central idea of the RAA is to constrain the almost infinite ''smart'' regulatory options by: the national policy style; adverse effects of policy arrangements of adjoining policies; the structure of the policy arrangement of the investigated policy and competence dependencies of other institutions. The reduction can be so drastic that the potential governance capacity falls below the smart regulation threshold. In other words, no smart regulatory arrangement can be developed in that institutional context unless policy learning occurs. In addition, a ''smart'' regulatory arrangement is no guarantee that the policy will succeed. For this reason, the performance of the regulatory arrangement is measured and evaluated. Performance below a certain threshold indicates that the regulatory arrangement needs to be adapted, which then results in policy learning. 123Policy Sci (2010) 43:245-261 DOI 10.1007 We illustrate the usefulness of this new approach with a secondary analysis of the Flemish sustainable forest management policy.

Unpacking the Path‐Dependent Process of Institutional Change for PPPs

“…Related to this, our findings provide insights on the relation between policy learning and policy arrangements. A PPP can be seen as a policy arrangement and the capacity of such an arrangement is defined as the extent to which this governance form is able to solve societal problems that are legitimately recognized by stakeholders (van Gossum et al ). We argue that the political and market landscape in the Netherlands was supportive for PPP which was consequently perceived as a legitimate form of infrastructure delivery, in contrast to Tamil Nadu.…”

“…There was a high level of coherence among the policy views of stakeholders and coherence between PPP and other policy arrangements in the Netherlands. In other words, this environment exhibited strategy coherence and structural coherence respectively (see Van Gossum et al ) this coherence was needed to enable learning and adaptation of institutional structures.…”

“…Hall (), in his analysis of the evolution of US governance, concluded that greater public management capacity enhances opportunities for democratic governance. Van Gossum et al () links governance capacity with legitimacy by defining governance capacity as the extent to which the form of governance is able to successfully solve societal or administrative problems that are legitimately recognized by the stakeholders. In their study on public accountability in Iran, Fard and Rostamy () found a clear relation between legal accountability or legitimacy and trust.…”

Smart regulation

“…In this regard, it may be that the complexity and sheer number of possible instrument/ party permutations dissuade policymakers from doing the necessary empirical research to effectively implement a smart regulation approach suitable for a given circumstance. If this is the case then, as van Gossum et al (2010) suggest, a streamlining and tailoring of key complementary approaches to particular institutional circumstances will be of assistance.…”

Which Fox in What Henhouse and When? Conjectures on Regulatory Capture

“…They see less need for the assistance of the community. Indeed, there is little logic in investing in costly regulatory agencies (Bernstein 1977; Van Gossum et al 2010; Wilson 1980).…”