2007
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.886901
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Big Business Owners in Politics

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Cited by 38 publications
(29 citation statements)
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“…Francis et al (2009: 696) illustrate that in the Chinese IPO market, which is strictly regulated by the government in terms of price-and quantity-fixing, politically connected firms obtain a "relatively higher offering price, lower underpricing and lower fixed costs during the goingpublic process". Finally, Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009) find that business tycoons holding top political offices in Thailand use their political power to implement/modify regulations and public policies in ways favourable to their firms.…”
Section: Public Versus Private Interests: Empirical Evidencementioning
confidence: 96%
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“…Francis et al (2009: 696) illustrate that in the Chinese IPO market, which is strictly regulated by the government in terms of price-and quantity-fixing, politically connected firms obtain a "relatively higher offering price, lower underpricing and lower fixed costs during the goingpublic process". Finally, Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009) find that business tycoons holding top political offices in Thailand use their political power to implement/modify regulations and public policies in ways favourable to their firms.…”
Section: Public Versus Private Interests: Empirical Evidencementioning
confidence: 96%
“…Note that moonlighting in this context if often understood to not only cover politicians hired by a firm, but also politicians' partial or complete ownership of a firm (Faccio 2006;Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang 2009).…”
Section: Moonlighting and Conflicts Of Interestmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Anticorruption reforms by the Malaysian government transformed the institutional environment and spawned enquiries into whether private gains continued to exist through political connections (Imai, 2006). Weak systems of checks and balance are institutional voids that allow politicians and firms to extract economic rents and encourage business owners to enter politics for private gains (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009). Some of the studies examined CPA in high corruption contexts where "social lending" (Khwaja & Mian, 2005) or "memo-lending" (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006) are prevalent.…”
Section: Emerging Countriesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Politicians on corporate boards may extract rent from firms (Carretta et al, 2012) or extend government rents to firms (Hillman, 2005). The entry of business executives into politics is motivated by several reasons which include the alignment of interests and rent extraction (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009).…”
Section: Mechanisms Underpinning the Cpa-firm Performance Relationshipmentioning
confidence: 99%