“…Scholars in international business (Doh & Lucea, ; Duanmu, ; Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen, & Nielsen, ; Frynas, Mellahi, & Pigman, ), strategy (Siegel, ; Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, ; Zhu & Chung, ), and economics (Faccio, ; Fisman, ) have long argued that firms' relationships with governments influence their strategy and performance. However, firms create such political connections through a wide range of different channels, such as lobbying, campaign donations, bribery, or personal relationships between firm decision makers and government, and little is known about how these different channels through which political connections are established affect specific strategy choices (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, ; Mahmood, Chung, & Mitchell, ; Rajwani & Liedong, ; Siegel, ; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, ; Zhu & Chung, ). Even the stream of literature that narrows the concept of firm political connections to those relationships that senior decision makers in a firm enjoy with government authorities has mostly overlooked differences that might arise as a consequence of which senior decision makers maintain these relationships (Sun et al, ).…”