Bi-national Management of a Transboundary Marine Fishery: Modelling the Destabilizing Impacts of Erratic Climate Shifts

The Incomplete‐information Split‐stream Fish War: Examining the Implications of Competing Risks

“…In this present article we introduce a more complex information structure than had been assumed in our earlier work (McKelvey and Golubtsov [2002], McKelvey, Miller and Golubtsov [2003], Mckelvey et al [2004]). Specifically, both stock-growth and stock-split parameters vary stochastically and asynchronously.…”

“…While improving the quality of information is always optimal for a centrally managed stochastic fishery, however in competitive harvesting, by contrast, enhancing information may actually be destructive in effect, serving to reinforce the negative consequence of the common property externality. Furthermore, as described in McKelvey et al [2004], this destructive effect carries over to the bargaining process whereby competing fleet managers negotiate terms of possible cooperation. Somewhat related is work of Laukkanen [2003], which points out that, in a sequential salmon fishery, unobservable environmental shocks may mask possible harvest cheating, thereby undermining the transparency needed for confident management cooperation.…”