Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies

Croissant, Aurel; Kuehn, David; Chambers, Paul; Wolf, Siegfried O.

doi:10.1080/13510347.2010.501180

Cited by 83 publications

(76 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Furthermore, it is civilians alone who determine which particular policies, or policy aspects, the military implements, and civilians also define the boundaries between policy-making and policy-implementation. Moreover, civilian authorities possess sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they can-in principle-revise their decisions at any time (Croissant et al 2010;see also Welch 1976;Kemp and Hudlin 1992;Pion-Berlin 1992;feaver 1996;Bland 2001).…”

Section: Conceptualizing the Dependent Variable: Civilian Control Of mentioning

confidence: 99%

Zivile Kontrolle des Militärs in jungen Demokratien: Agency, Struktur und institutioneller Wandel

et al. 2011

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this article integrates insights from historical institutionalism and arguments of strategic action in order to develop a new conceptual and theoretical approach to explaining changes in civil-military relations. In order to enforce civilian control over the military in new democracies, civilian decision-makers need to "break" stabilizing mechanisms of path dependence in civil-military relations. the ability of 'change agents' to overcome 'path dependence' depends on the concrete approach civilians take to reduce military power. Civilian choices, however, are structured by the specific structural, institutional and ideational contexts in which civil-military interaction takes place. these contextual factors also provide the constraints and resources for civilian actions. the civilian choices and the success of their control strategies are thus conditioned by the resources to which civilians have access and which allow them to initiate and consolidate changes vis-à-vis those actors opposing change in civil-military relations.Zusammenfassung: Durch die Verbindung von erkenntnissen des historischen Institutionalismus mit Argumenten des strategischen Handelns entwickelt der Artikel eine neue konzeptionelle und theoretische Herangehensweise zur erklärung der Veränderungen des Verhältnisses von Militär und zivilisten. In neuen Demokratien stellt die Durchsetzung ziviler Kontrolle des Militärs als Versuch ziviler entscheidungsträger, stabilisierende Mechanismen der Pfadabhängigkeit zivil-militärischer Beziehungen zu "durchbrechen", eine Herausforderung dar. Die fähigkeit von change agents die Pfadabhängigkeiten zu überwinden unterliegt der konkreten Herangehensweise der zivilisten zur Verringerung militärischer Macht. Jedoch gestalten die jeweiligen strukturellen, institutionellen und ideellen Rahmenbedingungen, innerhalb derer die zivil-militärischen Interaktionen erfolgen, die zivilen Wahlmöglichkeiten und stellen sowohl einschränkungen als auch Ressourcen zivilen Handelns dar. Die Wahlmöglichkeiten der zivilisten und der erfolg ihrer Kontrollstrategien werden dementsprechend durch die Ressourcen bedingt, zu welchen sie zugang haben und die es ihnen gestatten, Veränderungen hinsichtlich derjenigen Akteure zu initiieren und zu konsolidieren, die Veränderungen der zivil-militärischen Beziehungen ablehnen.

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Section: Conceptualizing the Dependent Variable: Civilian Control Of mentioning

confidence: 99%

Zivile Kontrolle des Militärs in jungen Demokratien: Agency, Struktur und institutioneller Wandel

et al. 2011

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“…17 Indeed, although scholars usually discuss coup-proofing with reference to coups in the classic sense, in practice it is unlikely that any authoritarian ruler that coup-proofs his regime does not also intend to insulate himself from the myriad ways in which the armed forces can challenge a civilian leadership. 18 More than merely preventing coups, therefore, coup-proofing strategies are intended to bind the security apparatus to the ruling regime to such an extent that the two become mutually dependent on one another. 19 Given the above discussion, military behavior during the Arab Spring presents a puzzling variation: the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries defected in their entirety when faced with mass protests; those in Syria and Bahrain continue to protect the ruling regime; and the armed forces in Yemen and Libya split between protection and defection.…”

Section: Coup-proofing and The Arab Spring Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring

Makara

2013

Democracy and Security

101

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“…For a more comprehensive discussion on the relevance of civilian control over the military in new democracies and the effects of weak or absent civilian control on democratic quality, see Croissant et al (2010). [2] Of course, the status of the international system at a given time is not a 'material' or 'objective' constant, but itself the result of prior agency*mostly of nation-states.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%