Beware the Inequality Trap

Low, Donald E.; Keong, Yeoh Lam

doi:10.2307/j.ctv1ntgrm.15

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Elections and Government Performance In Singapore1

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“…In the wake of public calls on the state to expand social spending and measures to deal with widening income inequality (Yeoh 2007;Low and Yeoh 2011;Bhaskaran et al 2012; Association of Women for Action and Research 2012; Tan 2012), as well as to rethink its aggressive growth strategies, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong responded with the claim that there are no real alternatives to existing policies. This is a claim that the one-party (People's Action Party, PAP) state has consistently made since national independence in the 1965s.…”

Section: Youyenn Teomentioning

confidence: 97%

The Global Political Economy of the Household in Asia

Elias

Gunawardana

2013

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Section: Youyenn Teomentioning

confidence: 97%

The Global Political Economy of the Household in Asia

Elias

Gunawardana

2013

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“…The PAP also addressed the increasing income inequality. In August 2013, after a year-long public consultation called ‘Our Singapore Conversation,’ the government announced a series of measures in the areas of housing, education, and health care, designed to target government spending at low- and middle-income people (Low and Keong, 2014). These measures were proven effective.…”

Section: Elections and Government Performance In Singaporementioning

confidence: 99%

Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme

Hong

Wong

2020

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, elite class members may lack incentive for the contribution of their efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study the decision of authoritarian rulers to introduce elections. Our model suggests that elections can motivate the ruling class to devote more effort to public good provision. As a result, elections alleviate the moral-hazard-in-teams problem within the authoritarian government. Excessive electoral control hinders the introduction of elections, but mild electoral control facilitates it. Our findings offer a new perspective on understanding authoritarian elections and explain many stylized facts in authoritarian regimes.

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Beware the Inequality Trap

Cited by 2 publications

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The Global Political Economy of the Household in Asia

The Global Political Economy of the Household in Asia

Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme

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