Between two selves: comparing global and local predictors of speed of switching between self-aspects

Brown, Christina M.; Bailey, Veronika; Stoll, Harrison; McConnell, Allen R.

doi:10.1080/15298868.2015.1082499

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…The existence of such overlapping features raises the possibility that more than one self-concept can be allocated as the self at once, perhaps due to spreading activation of features associated with several concepts (McConnell, Rydell, & Brown, 2009). For instance, some have speculated that those with greater working memory capacity might be capable of simultaneously activating two self-concepts (Brown, Bailey, Stoll, & McConnell, 2016), yet no work has explored such exciting possibilities.…”

Section: The Case For Multiple Self-allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With all that said, our results cannot rule out the possibility of simultaneous selfrepresentation altogether. Future work could explore whether multiple self-allocation might be elicited depending on other factors, including (i) cultural differences in independent versus interdependent self-orientation (Geertz, 1975;Grossmann & Na, 2014); (ii) individual differences in self-complexity (Linville, 1987;Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, & Revelle, 1999), a composite measure of the number of selves one identifies with and the features they share in common; (iii) individual difference in relative self-importance, the relative importance one places on different self-concepts (Brown et al, 2016;Sanz-Vergel, Demerouti, Bakker, & Moreno-Jiménez, 2011); and (iv) intersectional identities, whether one typically manages multiple self-concepts that are especially salient, as is common in transgender individuals and black women (De Vries, 2012;Reid & Comas-Diaz, 1990). Future work could also try splitting the self-relevance task across the visual hemifields, given that performance on other high-level tasks such as attentive tracking improves when items are divided across the hemifields, suggesting that each brain hemisphere has separate cognitive resources to devote to the items in its corresponding hemifield (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005;Sperry, Gazzaniga, & Bogen, 1969).…”

Section: Self-reference Effects For Various Imagined Self-conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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You Can Only Self-Represent One Identity at a Time

J¹,

Lj²,

Alvarez³

2019

Preprint

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A cornerstone of cognitive science is that mental systems are limited: There is a maximum amount of information they can process or store, beyond which performance breaks down. Yet so far the study of such limits has been focused on core systems like attention and memory. Here we explore self-representation, the ability to represent someone or something as being you. We find a limit on a well-known index of self-representation known as the self-reference effect, whereby people perform better for items that they associate with themselves than with others. This effect does not scale additively when people actively associate stimuli with more than one self-concept at a time (e.g., their younger and older selves, or two hypothetical versions of themselves). This suggests that even though we can self-represent various self-concepts independently, we can never do so for more than one self-concept simultaneously.

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Section: The Case For Multiple Self-allocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Self-reference Effects For Various Imagined Self-conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

You Can Only Self-Represent One Identity at a Time

J¹,

Lj²,

Alvarez³

2019

Preprint

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“…Fluid self-identity, which refers to the ability to reinterpret oneself to accommodate the immediate social environment, is a necessary precondition for social adaptability (Brown et al, 2016;Amiot et al, 2007;Wheeler et al, 2007;Markus & Kunda, 1986). For example, to understand the perspective of someone who holds different social values from one's own, we must not only take their perspective but also temporarily setting aside our own (Carr & Winkielman, 2014;De Jaegher, Di Paolo, Gallagher, 2010).…”

Section: Social Interaction Alters Neural Representations Of Self-ide...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Social interaction alters neural representations of self-identity: Evidence of possible neural precursors to social learning

Crafa,

Stoddart,

Makowski

et al. 2023

Preprint

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Social interaction requires enough social flexibility to accommodate an interlocutor’s perspective. Our previous research demonstrated that suppression of self-identity may be necessary during a social interaction with a friendly stranger if they have different social values. The present study examines neurobiological mechanisms responsible for suppressing self-identity and entertaining the stranger’s perspective. This study takes a semi-naturalistic neuroscience approach. Eighteen participants underwent an fMRI scan immediately after having a social interaction with a stranger. We hypothesized that pairing of activation in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) because they reflect activation of self-regulation and changes in self-identity. Brain activity in the IFG and dmPFC emerged, supporting our hypothesis and previous behavioral findings, and the precuneus played a key role. Evidence of social learning also emerged, which demonstrated that neural changes may occur before behavioral changes do. These findings suggest that social interaction influences self-identity on a neurobiological level and that neurobehavioral suppression of the social self may be a precursor to social learning. This study is the first to directly compare neural activation associated with active and stable self-concepts in an fMRI scanner after a social interaction. Findings will act as a foundation for future fully-naturalistic neuroscience studies to base hypotheses upon.

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